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Using material such as organisational reports and newspaper clippings, along with a survey of 
relevant literature on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, this thesis fills 
an important gap in the literature on the TRC's amnesty process by investigating the perspective 
and contribution of the South African human rights community on the novel form of amnesty 
involved in the TRC process. In so doing, the study draws on relevant comparisons with the role 
of the Argentine human rights movement in advocating for truth and justice for human rights 
atrocities following the restoration of civilian rule in Argentine 1983. The thesis adds new 
perspectives on the important debate around amnesty and prosecutions in the South African 
transitional context. It furthermore gives a unique insight into how these debates and 
contributions from important civil society members shaped the eventual TRC process which 
included a novel individual and conditional amnesty. In particular, it sheds new light on the 
eventual TRC process that was the result of a fusion of two different but parallel agendas: a 
civil-society based agenda for a victim-centred truth process and the official agenda for amnesty 
entrenched in the Postamble. 
Unlike the Argentine human rights movement, the SA human rights community's response to 
the issue of amnesty for human rights atrocities did not amount to a principled rejection based 
on human rights grounds. Instead, when the human rights community was given the opportunity 
to give its input on the legislation for an amnesty process, combined with a truth commission, 
this amounted to constructive input and an attempt to render the amnesty more acceptable from 
a human rights perspective than a general amnesty. Significantly however, the thesis finds that 
unlike the case of Argentine, the issue of amnesty versus prosecutions was not a priority for the 
South African human rights community in the transition. Instead, the human rights 
community's priorities during the transition resonated more with the need for socio-economic 
transformation than with the need to prosecute perpetrators of human rights atrocities in the 
wake of the transition. This may account for why there has been a lack of sustained mobilisation 
by the human rights community around the failure of the state to prosecute perpetrators who did 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
There is a large and diverse range of literature on the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) and its significance as a model for transitional justice. Among the more
problematic and controversial aspects of the TRC process has been its provision for amnesty
to perpetrators of past political atrocities and gross human rights violations. This particular 
aspect of the South African transition has been investigated in a number of general and more
specialised studies.
1
By comparison, there is little literature that seriously engages with the 
distinctive and particular role that civil society, or non-state actors, can play in developing
and advocating for transitional justice. 
This thesis seeks to fill an important gap in the literature on the TRC‟s amnesty process by
investigating the perspective and contribution of the South African human rights community
on the novel form of amnesty involved in the TRC process. In doing so, the approach of this
thesis differs from prevailing approaches in the literature in two important ways. Firstly, 
because amnesties are typically part of elite pacts in which civil society has no direct role, the
role of civil society in these processes has not been much considered. However, on closer 
investigation the distinctive origins, trajectories and outcomes of the amnesty processes in 
Argentine and South Africa have a great deal to do with the different perspectives and
contributions of the respective civil society agencies in general and the human rights 
communities in particular. Secondly, debates on amnesty typically concern the legal and
1
 Du Bois‐Pedain, Antje, 2007. Transitional amnesty in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Dugard, John. 1997. Is the Truth and Reconciliation Process Compatible with International Law? An 
Unanswered Question. South African Journal on Human Rights 13, pp.268-268; Dugard, John. 1998. 
Reconciliation and Justice: the South African Experience. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 8 (2), 
pp.277-311; Gibson, James L. 2002. Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of Amnesty in 
South Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), pp.540-556; Greenawalt, Kent. 2000. Amnesty‟s 
Justice. In Truth versus Justice. Eds. Robert Rotberg & Dennis Thompson. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 189-210; Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Diacritics 32 (3), pp. 33-59; Moellendorf, Darrel. 
1997. Amnesty, Truth and Justice: Azapo. South African Journal on Human Rights 13, pp. 283-91; Sarkin, 
Jeremy. 2004. Carrots and Sticks: the TRC and the South African Amnesty Process. Oxford, UK: Intersentia 
Publishers; Slye, Ronald. 2000. Justice and Amnesty. In Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Eds. Charles Villa-Vicencio & Willem Verwoerd. Cape 
Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, pp.174-183; Slye, Ronald 1999. Apartheid as a Crime 
against Humanity: a Submission to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Michigan Journal 
of International Law 20(2), pp.267-300; Van Zyl, Paul. 1999. Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of 














moral obligations of the state to hold perpetrators of past political atrocities and human rights 
violations accountable on the one hand and to ensure political stability and consolidation of 
democracy on the other hand.
2
 The approach of this thesis differs from this in that it amounts
to a specifically civil-society based approach to transitional justice and amnesty in the context 
of the South African transition. 
This thesis takes seriously the claim of O‟Donnell and Schmitter that “the dynamics of the
transition from authoritarian rule are not just a matter of elite dispositions, calculations, and
pacts.”
3
As their comparative analysis demonstrates, such dialectical developments as the
“resurrection of civil society” and the “restructuring of public space” in the transitional 
context brings about a general reconfiguration in the underlying relationships between 
political society and civil society. During the early stages of the transitional process there are
significant overlaps and fluctuations with civil society formations and public figures taking 
on quasi-political roles preparing the ground for political parties and processes. The roles of
different actors, whether representative of political organisations or civil-society based 
human rights society, or both, bear in different ways on the eventual outcomes of transitional 
justice processes and involve different mechanisms for “dealing with past”. A few scholars
have argued the importance of doing research on the role and impact of civil society on
transitional justice for this reason.
4
However, as David Backer argues, the role of non-state
actors is generally “under-appreciated” in the transitional justice literature.
5
2
Backer, David. 2003. Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and Prospects. Journal of 
Human Rights, 2(3), pp. 297-313
3
O‟Donnell, Guillermo & Schmitter, Philippe. 1986. Resurrecting Civil Society (and Restructuring Public
Space). In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. London:
John Hopkins University Press, pp.48-53
4
 Ibid.; Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 2002. Civil Society in Processes of Accountability. In Post-Conflict Justice. Ed. 
M.Cherif. Bassiouni. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers; Brahm, Eric. 2007. Transitional Justice,
Civil Society, and the Development of the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies. International Journal of Not-
for-Profit Law, 9(4), pp. 63-72; Crocker, David A. 2000. Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil
Society. In Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, pp. 99-121; Other literature on the topic of
civil society in relation to „transitional justice‟ tends to focus on the impact of the transition on the development
and sustainability of civil society and NGOs on the one hand, and on the role that NGOs can potentially play in
building and consolidating a new democracy on the other hand. A few country-specific case studies of civil
society‟s role in transitional justice also exist. See for example case studies on Morocco, Liberia and Indonesia:
Wilcox, Luke. 2009. Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission: Human Rights in Morocco‟s
Process of Political Reform. International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (1), pp. 49-68; Pajibo, Ezekiel.
2007. Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Liberia: A Practitioner‟s Reflection from the Field. International
Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2), pp. 287-296; Farid, Hilmar & Rikardo Simarmatra. 2004. The Struggle for
Truth and Justice: A Survey of Transitional Justice Initiatives Throughout Indonesia. International Centre for
Transitional Justice, January 2004. A number of papers on the topic of civil society in transitional justice in
Africa were presented at a conference held on this subject. As was acknowledged at the conference, there is yet
much research to be done on the particular role of civil society in advocating for and supporting local














The specific role and impact of civil society and especially of the human rights community in
the origins and fashioning of the South African Truth and Reconciliation, and the distinctive
amnesty process in particular, is worthy of investigation for a number of reasons. First, civil 
society made significant contributions to the origins and fashioning of the TRC.
6
While
officially mandated and resourced by the state, the proposal for an official TRC process was
arguably initiated by civil society figures who secured the support of Mandela and Dullah
Omar as the Minister of Justice. Indeed, compared to the Latin American cases, the TRC was
a significantly more inclusive and participatory process. This was due to the significantly
different processes involved in the creation of the TRC by parliamentary legislation rather
than by presidential decree. The Argentine truth commission was created as a presidential
initiative in which the President unilaterally decreed the mandate, objectives and composition 
of the commission. The South African TRC, including the amnesty aspect, was a
parliamentary commission the mandate, objectives and composition of which was subject to a
process of public comment and parliamentary debate. In contrast to the Latin American truth
commissions which were essentially top-down interventions on the authority of the president, 
the general mandate and objectives of the TRC as well as the particulars of the legislation 
were developed in the course of an extensive public process while the composition of the 
Commission was also the outcome of a public process of nominations, hearings and
consultations. To this end the public was invited to make written and oral submissions on the
draft TRC bill. Civil society did make use of this opportunity to contribute to „transitional 
justice‟ in South Africa. However, little attention has been paid to their distinctive 
perspectives and contributions in the literature. Instead, most accounts tend to focus on the
development of key aspects of transitional justice in SA in relation to the main political
actors and issues. 
2010. Advocating Justice: Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Africa. Twickenham Guest House, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, August 30-31  
5 
Backer 2003, p. 197 
6
 Van Der Merwe, Hugo, Polly Dewhirst & Brandon Hamber. 1999. Non-governmental organisations and the 
truth and reconciliation commission: an impact assessment. Politikon 26(1), pp.55-79. Hamber, Brandon, Tlhoki 
Mofokeng & Graeme Simpson. 1997. Evaluating the Role and Function of Civil Society in a Changing South 
Africa: The TRC, a Case Study. Paper presented on behalf of CSVR at The Role of Southern Civil 
Organisations in the Promotion of Peace Seminar, DHR Seminar, hosted by the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, London, November 10; Simpson, Graeme. 1994. Truth, Dare or Promise: Civil society 
and the proposed commission on truth and reconciliation. Paper presented at Making Ends Meet: Reconciliation 














It may arguably have been expected that civil society, and the human rights community in 
particular, would have been strongly opposed to any form of amnesty to perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights. In the event the contributions from the SA human rights 
community were surprisingly supportive and posed little generalised opposition to the 
amnesty proposals. This provides a further strong reason for investigating the contributions 
from civil society, with a special focus on the human rights community, to the origins and 
fashioning of the TRC. 
The few studies already done on the contribution of civil society to the TRC are mainly
descriptive accounts of the role that particular South African civil society organisations 
played in developing and supporting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a whole.
7
These studies tend to be narrowly concerned with particular civil society contributions to the
TRC process itself but do not provide a more general civil society-based perspective on 
transitional justice issues in the South African transitional context. Indeed, the amnesty issue
surfaced in South African politics and as a human rights issue throughout the early 1990s
even before the conclusion of the negotiations at the end of 1993. In particular, existing
studies of civil society involvement in the TRC process are not particularly concerned with 
the issue of amnesty. 
In addition, there have been significant post-TRC developments on aspects relating to the
issue of prosecutions or amnesty/pardons which are not covered in the existing literature. Part
of the amnesty arrangement was that perpetrators who did not apply for amnesty or who were
denied amnesty at the TRC would be liable to prosecution. However, the fact is that in South
Africa there have been only a handful of complementary and follow-up prosecutions for
apartheid-era perpetrators not immunised by the amnesty. Since the dismantling of the
Amnesty Committee in 2001 there have been no prosecutions of such perpetrators. The
specific focus of this thesis on the issue of amnesty was adopted partly in light of recent and
continuing controversy over the issue, which thirteen years on from the disbanding of the 
TRC, and eight years on from the closing of the Amnesty Committee, still constitutes part of
the TRC‟s so-called „unfinished business‟. At present, a core of South African human rights
organisations and professionals are mobilised around these outstanding issues. However,
7
 See also Koetz, Meverett. 1994. The Responsibilities of Civil Society: Priorities, Strategies and Concerns for 















unlike in Argentine, the South African human rights community hasn‟t effectively mobilised 
around the issue of outstanding prosecutions.  There has been minimal activity or intervention 
from the South African human rights community in response to the state‟s apparent „back-
tracking‟ on complementary and follow-up prosecutions from the TRC.  This prompts the 
question to what extent the SA human rights community was concerned with retributive 
justice and legal accountability as a priority for the human rights community from the very 
beginning?  While an exhaustive account of the outstanding prosecutions matter is outside the 
scope of this mini-thesis, the issue motivates this historical and analytical account of civil 
society‟s role and impact on the amnesty issue from the outset of the transition. 
1.1 Perspectives on amnesty in transitional justice 
From a general human rights perspective amnesty is a profoundly problematic issue, raising
basic questions of moral, legal and political principle. On the one hand there is a legal and
moral duty to hold perpetrators of past political atrocities responsible for their actions, while
on the other hand in the context of a fragile transition, it would be unrealistic to expect that
the former regime will relinquish power if there is a possibility that they will have to face
prosecution once they do so. In that case the duty to establish accountability for the past
atrocities comes into conflict with the duty to prevent further atrocities by facilitating a
peaceful transition.
8
It is important to embed the analysis of amnesty in the dual contexts of a
general human rights perspective on amnesty as well as of a contextualised account of the
South African post-apartheid transition. This subsection therefore gives a brief account of the
issue of amnesty from a general human rights perspective and as a problem of transitional 
justice.  It also locates the problem of amnesty within the particular South African transitional 
context.
1.1.1 Blanket amnesty as a principled human rights issue and in the transitional justice 
context 
8
 See the classic debate on this between Carlos Nino and Diane Orentlicher. Nino, Carlos. 1991. The duty to 
punish abuses of human rights put into context: the case of Argentina. Yale Law Journal, 100(8), pp. 2619-2640 
Orentlicher, Diane. 1991. A Reply to Professor Nino. Yale Law Journal 100 (8), pp. 2641-2643. See also 
Orentlicher, Diane F. 1991. Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime. Yale Law Journal 100 (8), pp. 2537-2615; See Zalaquett, Jose 1992. Balancing Ethical Imperatives and 
Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations. Hastings 
Law Journal 43(6), pp.1426-1432; Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 














From a human rights perspective general or „blanket‟ amnesties are especially problematic in
that they grant unqualified immunity to the perpetrators of gross human rights atrocities.
9
This type of general amnesty granted to a class of state agents by executive decree is
sometimes referred to as an „amnesic‟ amnesty because it serves to „erase‟ and even deny
human rights atrocities committed in the past.
10
In this sense a general amnesty may be
viewed as an instrument of forgetting and ignoring the past; it not only fails to establish the
truth about past political atrocities, but denies the very need for acknowledgement of past
wrongs. Their defining features are concealment of the atrocities and anonymity for the 
perpetrators, amounting to a complete lack of acknowledgement and accountability for past 
human rights atrocities, and therefore total impunity.
11
Furthermore there is typically no
moral condemnation of past atrocities and violations.
12
In this way general amnesties serve as
the opposite of accountability: because of their broad scope of application general amnesties 
have no procedural requirements and thus do not offer the possibility of individual
identification of those responsible (nor of the victims or the atrocities committed).
13
General 
amnesties thus amount to a rejection of accountability and responsibility for past human
rights violations.
14
For these reasons international human rights law and practice very much 
condemns the use of general amnesties for the perpetrators of human rights atrocities.
15
Likewise it has become a basic tenet of the global human rights movement that justice for
past violations is tied up with the duty to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights
atrocities.
16
From a principled human rights perspective the state thus has a basic duty to
prosecute the perpetrators of human rights atrocities while the decision for amnesty must
amount to an unacceptable moral and political compromise.
9
For a thorough discussion of this see Slye 2002
10
 Burke-White, William. 2001. Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis 




 Du Toit, Andre. 2000. The Moral foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgment, Justice 




 On the issue of amnesty and accountability see Young, Gwen K. 2001. Amnesty and Accountability. U.C. 
Davis Law Review 35, pp.427-482 
15
 See for example Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 1990. State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human 
Rights Violations in International Law. California Law Review 78 (2), pp.449 
16
 See Scharf, Michael. 1996. Accountability for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental 
Human Rights. Law and Contemporary Problems 59(4), pp. 41-61. Three points can be argued in this regard: i) 
the state has an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations and thereby pursue the goals 
of the criminal justice system to establish truth, responsibility and accountability for gross human rights 
violations, ii) a failure to prosecute human rights violations also violates (for a second time) the fundamental 
rights of victims under international law iii) amnesties undermine respect for human rights and the rule of law in 
society. 
16
 So, in practice amnesties for human rights violators create a culture of impunity that encourages 
further human rights violations. As against this it is postulated that prosecution serves as a deterrent against 
















As against such a principled human rights position, a typical „transitional justice‟ approach 
also takes into account political and practical considerations of what is feasible and possible 
in the actual context of transition from authoritarian rule. While a principled human rights 
perspective holds that human rights cannot be overridden “by subordinating them to a 
calculus of the greatest overall societal good”,
17
 a transitional justice approach may seek to 
reconcile the objective of accountability for human rights atrocities with what is best for the 
overall societal good in the particular transitional context (e.g. by facilitating a peaceful 
democratic transition and the cessation of human rights violations). From a transitional 
justice perspective the political imperative to grant amnesty to perpetrators of past human 
rights violations for the sake of securing a peaceful transition to democracy may be a 
legitimate one.
18
 Jose Zalaquett, a human rights lawyer and key figure in the Chilean Truth 
Commission, argued that politicians first have a responsibility to prevent recurring atrocities 
even if this is at the expense of prosecuting perpetrators of past human rights violations. 
Zalaquett invoked Max Weber‟s distinction between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics 
of conviction to argue that in the context of transitions from authoritarian rule democratic 
politicians‟ first duty was to prevent future violations.
19
 In his famous lecture Politics as a 
Vocation, Weber argued that political leaders should be guided not by ethical principles 
regardless of the outcome but had to take responsibility for the unintended but “predictable 
outcome of their decisions”.
20
 Applying this to the transitional justice context, Zalaquett 
argued that it would be irresponsible for politicians to insist on prosecutions in an incomplete 
and fragile transition when insisting on prosecutions may result in a political or military 
backlash defeating the original ethical objective to protect human rights. Politicians cannot be 
guided by „ethics of conviction‟ only, but must be responsible for probable consequences, or 




It may also be argued that amnesty is not necessarily a matter of principle only, but that its 
legitimacy could also depend on the particular way of arriving at it (e.g., was the amnesty the 
outcome of a negotiated settlement or was it a unilateral decision taken by the former 
regime?). For example, in the context of a democratic transition it may be that amnesties 
                                                          
17
 Roht-Arriaza 1994, p.17 
18
 Young, Gwen K. 2001. „Amnesty and Accountability.‟ U.C. Davis Law Review 35, p.427, 444, 476;  
19



















granted as part of a negotiated political compromise retain more legitimacy than amnesties 
granted unilaterally by the beneficiaries unto themselves.
22
 The attempt by the Argentine 
junta to entrench amnesty for its generals and officers in 1983 after their defeat in the 
Falklands war was an example of an amnesty that was deemed illegitimate mainly because it 
was a self-amnesty. Slye argued that “[p]olitically speaking, greater legitimacy is perceived 
when the civilian government offers amnesty for military crimes as a means of moving 
toward a better future.”
23
 This was an argument used by human rights organisations in the 
South African case which will be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
 
These competing perspectives and debates on amnesty versus prosecutions for human rights 
violations are a staple of transitional justice literature. In this thesis we will be concerned with 
the domestic human rights community‟s perspectives on, and contributions to, the amnesty 
process and the extent to which these arguments and discussions took place amongst the 
human rights community at the time. This is an empirical and historical question: it cannot be 
assumed that the South African human rights community necessarily adopted a principled 
human rights perspective on the issue of amnesty. Rather, it will be a question for historical 
investigation to what extent the South African human rights community did adopt such a 
principled human rights stance on amnesty and/or were swayed by other considerations 
regarding the realities of the local political, social and economic transitional contexts in 
determining what was needed on the one hand, and what was possible on the other. 
 
1.1.2 Political context of amnesty in the South African transition 
 
Apartheid was a policy of political, economic and social racial segregation and discrimination 
entrenched by the National Party government from 1948 to 1994. This was carried out by a 
long list of legislative acts that assigned races to different residential areas,
24
 restricted the 
right of black people to own land, enforced segregation of public facilities,
25
 restricted black 
people to unskilled labour and low-wage employment,
26
 and created a separate and inferior 
education for black people
27
 to name a few. The government used its „total strategy‟ to justify 
                                                          
22
 Slye 2002, p.245 
23
 Weiner, Robert O. 1995. Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights 
Amnesties. St. Mary‟s Law Journal 26 (3), pp.859-876. See also Zalaquett 1992, pp.1425-1426 
24
 Group Areas Act of 1950 (Act No. 41 of 1950) 
25
 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (Act No 49 of 1953) 
26
 Mines and Works Act (Act no 12 of 1911, amended in 1926) 
27















the extreme measures of repression and violence used against dissidents.
28
 Repression also 
took more covert forms that the state denied its part in such as torture which was rife in 
prisons, deaths in detention and also covert state operations including torture camps and 
illegal detention centres, disappearances and assassinations. The government, as well as 
covert state operatives, conducted their activities with widespread impunity and minimal 
accountability. The widespread and systemic denial of the fundamental rights of human 
beings led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the Convention on the Suppression 





The transition was officially set in motion when De Klerk announced the unbanning of the 
ANC and other liberation movements, as well as the release of Mandela on 2 February 1990. 
There was at this time a stalemate in which the ANC‟s “armed struggle” and the NP 
government‟s “total strategy” made way for the beginning of “talks about talks” which 
opened the way for political negotiations. After the first official meetings of the government 
and the ANC took place in May 1990 in Cape Town, the “Groote Schuur Minute” 
establishing a working group to consider the release of political prisoners was signed by both 
parties.
30
 A few months later in August 1990 the parties signed the “Pretoria Minute” in 
which among other things the ANC agreed to suspend all armed actions with immediate 
effect.
31
 Direct discussions over a democratic South Africa founded on a new constitution 
began a year later in December 1991 when the first Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) was set in motion.   However, the key issue was not yet that of amnesty 
for past human rights violations but rather of indemnity to enable the political negotiations to 
proceed. While it is likely that the need for a possible “amnesty deal” for past political 
atrocities was an underlying or background consideration from an early stage of the political 
negotiations, it was not explicitly posed in these terms at the time. Rather, this initial 
provision for Indemnity was necessary because of the fact that key leaders of the ANC and 
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other liberation movements crucial to the onset of the political negotiations were serving 
prison sentences, or were at risk of being incarcerated, merely because they were members of 
banned organisations.  The Indemnity Act 35 of 1990 served the function of enabling 
constitutional negotiations to proceed.  It meant that exiled ANC members who would 
otherwise be liable to be detained and prosecuted on return to South Africa could now return 
to South Africa without this threat.  
 
From a principled human rights perspective this indemnity did not necessarily raise the same 
moral objections as amnesty for perpetrators of past human rights violations. In practice, the 
indemnity was mostly limited to the category of persons who had not themselves committed 




After the first Indemnity Act of 1990 was implemented, the ANC‟s contention that many 
members of the liberation struggle were still incarcerated as political prisoners became a 
major issue in the attempts to resume the constitutional negotiations which had broken down 
in May 1992. To deal with this the NP put in place the Further Indemnity Act 151 in October 
of 1992. Unlike the first Indemnity Act, the Further Indemnity Act came to include the 
release of prisoners who had been convicted o  gross human rights violations. At this point, 
the matter therefore implicitly became a matter of principle from a human rights perspective. 
The way in which the issue of the further indemnities rose was complex and contested, both 
at the time and retrospectively. Whatever the intricacies of the Act, the prospect of 
perpetrators convicted of gross human rights violations being granted indemnity/amnesty 
under the new Act was clearly an emerging issue from a human rights perspective and began 
to be debated and discussed among civil society and within the human rights community.    
These early debates are significant and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
The prospect of a possible „general amnesty‟ for human rights violations remained a 
politically contentious one throughout the constitutional negotiations though significantly it 
never actually featured on the agenda or in open discussions at CODESA until the Postamble 
of the Interim Constitution with its provision for „amnesty‟ was adopted in the closing stages 
of reaching a negotiated settlement. There are various and conflicting accounts of how the 
issue of amnesty eventually emerged in the context of the Postamble which will not be 
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pursued in this thesis. However, by most accounts, agreement on the issue of amnesty was 
reached at the last minute before the signing of the Interim Constitution on 6 December 
1993.
33
 The issue of amnesty for human rights atrocities was the only outstanding issue and 
had the potential of derailing a final transitional peace agreement. Amidst implied threats 
representatives of the security forces and of the National Party government insisted that 
provision for amnesty be included in the 1993 Interim Constitution. Key ANC members on 
the constitutional committee wanted to object in principle to an “amnesty deal” but in the 
event the ANC agreed to include the amnesty provision in the Postamble of the Interim 
Constitution, knowing full well that the assistance and cooperation of the armed forces would 
be necessary to see South Africa through the coming democratic elections.
34
 The Postamble 
of the Interim Constitution framed the amnesty as necessary for „national unity‟ and 
„reconciliation‟ in South Africa.‟
35
 Placed in the context of the Postamble, and as a pivotal 
component of the negotiated settlement, the amnesty was framed as a transitional justice issue 
rather than as a principled human rights concern.  The question of how the amnesty provision 
was perceived and debated by the human rights community at the time is discussed in later 
chapters.   
 
Following the signing of the Interim Constitution at the end of 1993, the first democratic 
elections were held in April 1994 and the new Government of National Unity led by Mandela 
as President was inaugurated. Significantly, and unlike the case in Argentine, the issue of 
“dealing with the past” in terms of transitional justice initiatives around “truth” and “justice” 
did not feature as part of any political parties‟ election campaign. Behind the scenes however, 
and particularly in the lead up to the April 1994 elections, when political parties were 
preoccupied with the politics of the transition and the democratic elections, key individuals 
from civil society played a robust role in instigating and encouraging discussions about the 
possibility of holding a victim-oriented truth commission in South Africa. It was only after 
complex interactions between new Justice Minister Dullah Omar and some members of the 
human rights community that Minister Omar announced that there would be an official truth 
commission including an amnesty process set up. From very early on, Minister Omar 
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signalled his intentions to involve civil society and the public in the setting up of such a truth 
commission.  
 
Significantly, the TRC was set up as a parliamentary commission meaning that the process 
involved in its creation was not by presidential decree, as in the case of Argentine, but rather 
involved a comparatively public process. After the Portfolio Committee had heard 
representations by civil society and other interested parties, the TRC Bill was subjected to 
numerous rounds of further amendments and intense debates in Parliament.
36
 This process 
was finalised on 19 July 1995 when the Bill was signed into law. After a wide and 
consultative appointment procedure, commissioners were appointed to the TRC on 15 
December 1995 and the TRC Act came into effect on the same day. 
 
1.1.3 Individual and conditional amnesty in SA 
 
The South African amnesty that was part of the TRC process took a novel form compared to 
previous blanket amnesties. Significantly, the South African amnesty was a conditional 
amnesty for which perpetrators of human rights violations had to apply on an individual 
basis. Perpetrators were required to give full and public disclosure of all the details of the 
human rights violation(s) in question as well as relevant events surrounding these. 
Furthermore, the applicant had to satisfy the Amnesty Committee that the act(s) in question 
were associated with a political objective. The relevant considerations of an individual 
amnesty conditional on full (public) truth disclosure may render the amnesty more acceptable 
from a human rights perspective than a blanket amnesty. 
 
Firstly, the TRC‟s conditional amnesty was actually designed, not as an instrument of 
forgetting and ignoring past political atrocities, but to be part of a truth process. The full-
disclosure requirement for the SA amnesty was intended to encourage the recovery of the 
„truth‟ about the apartheid past and in particular apartheid-era human rights atrocities which 
had for so long been covered up and denied by the apartheid government. Perpetrators were 
more likely to come forward with the truth about their involvement in gross human rights 
violations if doing so would present the opportunity of gaining amnesty from prosecution and 
punishment. In this sense, the objective of the South African conditional amnesty was not to 
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frustrate or prevent exposing the truth about human rights atrocities, as a blanket amnesty 
would, but rather to encourage truth exposure. For these reasons, the South African individual 
and conditional amnesty linked with full-disclosure may not raise the same principled 
concerns from a human rights perspective that a blanket amnesty that promotes impunity and 
amnesia about the past. 
 
Secondly, it was a clear implication of the amnesty granted on this individual and conditional 
basis that perpetrators of human rights violations who did not apply for amnesty, or who did 
not meet the requirements for amnesty (full disclosure, political objective etc.) would be 
liable for possible prosecution via the ordinary criminal justice system. In that sense 
individual and conditional amnesty, unlike general blanket amnesty, does not rule out further 
prosecutions of perpetrators of human rights violations, but actually implies this as a 
necessary counterpart of the amnesty process. While blanket amnesty typically forecloses the 
option of prosecution in general terms, the South African amnesty implied criminal 
prosecutions of perpetrators who did not apply for amnesty or who were denied amnesty by 
the TRC. Again, this important characteristic of the South African amnesty may change the 
principled considerations of amnesty from a human rights perspective. 
 
For our purposes the question is what the perspective on and contribution of the South 
African human rights community to the development of this special type of individual and 
condition amnesty was at the time. Taking into account the general „transitional justice‟ and 
„human rights‟ perspectives on amnesty discussed above, the thesis explores the perspective 
of the SA human rights community on the „justice vs. amnesty‟ dilemma in the particular 
context of the South African transition. For example, did the SA human rights community 
perceive the amnesty in SA as legitimate because it was the outcome of a negotiated 
settlement instead of a unilaterally imposed self-amnesty such as the amnesty in Argentine? 
Did the human rights community perceive that the amnesty was a justified compromise in 
order to achieve the outcome of a peaceful transition? What was their perspective on how the 
issue of amnesty tied in with important transitional justice considerations such as truth 
















1.2 Research design and thesis structure 
 
From a historical perspective it is relevant that the amnesty announced with the signing of the 
Postamble to the Interim Constitution at the end of 1993 was not yet the individual and 
conditional amnesty tied to a truth commission that it eventually developed into. The 
Postamble merely announced that “there shall be amnesty”, leaving the procedures for this to 
be determined by the new democratic Parliament. The defining features of the South African 
amnesty differentiating it from a general amnesty were not yet stipulated in the Postamble but 
were subsequently developed by a combination of government and civil society actors, 
including some from the human rights community. Accordingly this thesis will investigate 
the human rights community‟s response to the amnesty issue in the changing historical 
contexts, and not just as a single general issue. The general research design and thesis 
structure relates to significant key moments in the development of amnesty as an issue of 
transitional justice, focusing on the key junctures when the issue became one that the SA 
human rights community could address. This way we may gain a thorough understanding 
both of the origins of the amnesty issue and the particular contexts in which the human rights 
community responded as well as contributed to it. 
 
Chapter Two will investigate the comparative perspective of the Argentine human rights 
movement on the issues of amnesty and prosecutions for human rights violations in the 
transitional justice context. In the case of Argentine a formidable human rights movement 
effectively mobilised around the issue of amnesty and prosecutions of perpetrators from the 
military juntas who had been responsible for such human rights violations as the 
“disappearances” and torture of civilian victims. Certainly it was primarily the human rights 
movement that put the issues of impunity and accountability, amnesty and criminal 
prosecutions onto the agenda in the transitional period. Using accounts from various 
secondary literature sources, the second chapter will provide an account of the role of the 
human rights movement Argentine in the transitional process with a specific focus on the 
issue of amnesty and prosecutions.
37
 The idea is that this will provide a useful springboard 
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from which to study the role of the South African human rights community with regard to 
amnesty as an issue of transitional justice in the different context of the 1994 transition to 
democracy.   
 
The main body of the thesis will provide a descriptive and historical account of the South 
African human rights community‟s perspective on, and contribution to, the development of 
the issue of amnesty versus prosecutions of perpetrators of human rights atrocities committed 
during apartheid. It will concentrate on the crucial transition period, beginning in 1990 and up 
until after the 1994 elections and the launch of the TRC in 1995. The overall account will be 
divided into three parts according to three distinct and critical periods in the development of 
the amnesty issue. Each chapter will be mainly descriptive and will pay close attention to the 
implications of the relevant political context in that historical period.   
 
Thus, Chapter Three deals with the first critical period around the time of the Record of 
Understanding in the latter half of 1992 when „indemnity‟ was extended to include human 
rights violations with the Further Indemnity Act of 1992. While the full circumstances of the 
complex and contested interactions between the ANC and the National Party government 
regarding a possible “amnesty deal” remain obscure the relevant issue for the purposes of this 
thesis concerns the ways in which the issue of amnesty for human rights violations became a 
controversial one in the public domain at this time. Statements on the issue of a possible 
general amnesty were made by various political groupings as well as by some civil society 
members. Primary material (newspaper articles, press statements, organisational newsletters 
and position papers etc.) and some secondary material (articles published by influential 
human rights activists and lawyers in journals such as the South African Human Rights 
Journal) will be used to determine the extent to which the human rights community took a 
direct interest in this issue at the time.  
 
Chapter Four moves on to deal with the period when the CODESA II negotiations were 
concluded with the signing of the 1993 Interim Constitution. The Chapter describes the 
human rights community‟s initial responses to the provision for amnesty contained in the 
Postamble of the Interim Constitution. The discussion is based on similar primary and 
secondary materials as those used in Chapter Three. The collection of presentations made at 
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the two transitional justice workshops held in 1994 will be used as an indication of the type 
of issues being debated amongst civil society and the human rights community at this time. 
Again, we will seek to establish the extent to which the issue of amnesty and legal 
accountability for the past was a major concern for the human rights community in this 
context. How did the human rights community understand the problem of amnesty and legal 
accountability for past human rights abuses and what proposals, if any, did they suggest for 
how the problem could and should be addressed? 
 
Chapter Fives moves on to discuss a third critical period in the development of the amnesty 
issue – around the time that the founding legislation for the TRC was being developed, that is 
from mid-1994 to mid-1995.  Soon after Justice Minister Dullah Omar‟s announcement in 
May 1994 that there would be a state mandated and resourced truth commission, some 
members of civil society and the human rights community submitted proposals for such a 
truth commission. Subsequently civil society was invited to make formal written submissions 
on a draft bill for the prospective TRC, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Bill. The conference presentations and the subsequent submissions made by human rights 
organisations on the draft PNUR Bill are used to establish the human rights community‟s 
perspective on and contribution to this important piece of legislation, paying particular 
attention to the issue of amnesty. 
 
An important part of the amnesty arrangement had been that perpetrators who did not apply 
for amnesty, or who were denied amnesty by the TRC, would be liable to prosecution. 
However, in fact there have been only a handful of post-TRC complementary and follow-up 
prosecutions for apartheid-era perpetrators not protected by amnesty from the TRC. Despite 
this, the South African human rights community hasn‟t effectively mobilised around the 
lingering issues of outstanding prosecutions.
38
 Moreover, there has been minimal response 
from the South African human rights community to this apparent „back-tracking‟ on 
complementary and follow-up post-TRC prosecutions. The concluding chapter will therefore 
discuss the significance of the human rights community‟s overall response to the amnesty. .In 
retrospect this may raise the question to what extent the human rights community had this 
expectation of the South African amnesty in the first place (i.e.: that perpetrators who did not 
receive amnesty or apply for amnesty from the TRC would be liable to prosecution). Had it 
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been the case that the human rights community acquiesced in the legitimacy of the amnesty 
process on the basis of it being an individual and conditional amnesty linked with a broader 
truth process, then it is curious that the human rights community has not mounted sustained 
activism in response to the lack of complementary or follow up prosecutions.  In short, is 
there any relation between the human rights community‟s role in the issue of amnesty at the 
time of the transition and the almost complete lack of follow-up prosecutions that were 















CHAPTER 2: LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENTS AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE ARGENTINE CASE 
 
 
The role and impact of the human rights movement in Argentine on questions of amnesty and 
legal accountability in transitional justice provide for interesting and illuminating 
(dis)analogies with that of the human rights community in South Africa. The Argentine 
transition (1982-1984) saw one of the most far-reaching efforts to establish truth and 
retributive justice for human rights violations perpetrated by the prior regime of the military 
junta.  The human rights movement in Argentine played a significant role in shaping the 
agenda of democratisation in favour of the human rights principles of “truth” and “justice”.
39
  
Indeed, by the time of the transition from military rule to democracy, an impressive human 
rights movement had been mobilised in Argentine. This human rights movement was 
comprised of an array of human rights organisations and activists, lawyers, victims groups, 
victims‟ family groups, religious organisations and other non-governmental organisations. 
This chapter tracks the development of the human rights movement in Argentine in relation 
to transitional justice issues of retributive justice for human rights violations as well as the 
issue of truth about past political atrocities and “the disappeared.” To what extent did the 
human rights movement consider amnesty and prosecutions from a principled human rights 
perspective and to what extent did they allow for pragmatic and political considerations in the 
particular context of the Argentine transition? To what extent, and in what ways, did this 
movement mobilise publicly around the issue of prosecutions for human rights violations? 
How did the human rights movement seek to impact the public and political agenda? What 
contextual factors influenced the human rights movements in pressing for retributive justice 
for perpetrators of human rights violations? The case is examined to the extent that it 
provides comparison with similar (or alternate) modes of engagement by South African 
human rights proponents during the transition from apartheid 
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2.1 The human rights movement during the military dictatorship 
 
The military rule of Argentine, from 1976 to 1983 was characterised by “disappearances”, 
imprisonment, torture and killings of outspoken political dissidents. Throughout this period 
the junta officially denied responsibility for the “disappearances” of between 9,000 and 
30,000 people.
40
   It justified its tight grip on state politics as a response to perceived 
“terrorist” threats to the state and pursued a covert “dirty war” in which it sought to eliminate 
these “subversive elements.” In response, as human rights violations and disappearances of 
political dissidents became more pervasive, organisations of victims and victims‟ families 
were created.
41
 The most famous of these is the mother‟s resistance movement which came to 
be known as Las Madres de Plazo de Mayo for their regular demonstrations on the Plaza in 
Buenos Aires denouncing political disappearances in Argentine. Las Madres worked with 
other victims‟ organisations in denouncing human rights violations, giving support to victims 
and seeking legal advice from human rights organisations.  
 
At this stage two types of organisations could be distinguished within the broad human rights 
movement, victims‟ organisations and traditional human rights bodies. Victims associations 
were made up of people directly affected by the policies of the government, i.e. the relatives 
of the “disappeared” while “nonaffected” human rights organisations included mostly legal 
human rights organisations.
42
 In response to the increase in human rights violations from the 
time of the coup, a few pre-existing human rights organisations together with newly formed 
human rights organisations and victims‟ organisations formed alliances and sought ways to 
denounce violations and defend human rights.
43
   This emergence of human rights activists 
and organisations was a relatively new phenomenon in Argentine – previous repressive eras 
had generated some human rights activity but no broadly based human rights movement like 
the one that emerged in response to human rights violations and repression in the years 1973-
1984.
44
 The human rights movement therefore emerged as a contextual response to the 
repression and human rights abuses. 
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During the repression, human rights organisations played a major role in systematically 
recording human rights violations and formally registered denunciations by victims, and their 
families, of “disappearances” and cases of torture and killings.
45
 On this basis human rights 
lawyers geared their work around representing victims and their families and making judicial 
demands that human rights violations be investigated and prosecuted. Jelin argues that in the 
absence of political opposition, the human rights movement became “the key actor in the 
development of societal demands for the defence of human rights.”
46
 The demands of Las 
Madres and the victims‟ organisations were certainly a focal point for the human rights 
movement; typically this took the form of demands for the “truth” about the “disappeared” 
and “justice” in terms of prosecutions of the perpetrators.
47
  Marches and public 
demonstrations by Las Madres and other victims groups were inspired by their desire to know 
the fate of their disappeared children, husbands, brothers and sisters but were insistently 
accompanied with the demand for justice and punishment of the perpetrators. During protest 
marches, demonstrators carried banners with slogans such as “Where are the disappeared?” 




The eventual democratic transition was prompted by the military‟s external defeat in the 
Falklands war combined with an economic crisis and a loss of legitimacy internally. 
However, even before the defeat of the military in the Falklands war, the human rights 
movement had played an important role in delegitimising the military with open protests 
which received wide social support.
49
 Towards the end of 1982, with the military junta by 
this stage significantly weakened, the human rights movement “made the transition to a mass 
movement capable of mobilising hundreds of thousands in the streets.”
50
 According to 
Munck, mass demonstrations for democracy in December 1982 brought the final blow to the 
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2.2 The Military’s attempts to entrench impunity 
 
In April 1983, in the face of mass demonstrations demanding the truth about the disappeared 
and justice for human rights violations, the junta attempted to put to bed the issue of 
“disappearances” with the “Final Document of the Military Junta on the War against 
Subversion and Terrorism.”
52
 This document called for national “reconciliation” and sought 
to justify the disappearances and killings on the basis that they were the casualties of a 
justified war against subversion and terrorism. The Documento final also declared that 
unresolved cases of disappearances should be considered closed. This move provoked the ire 
of the human rights movement which staged a march of 30 000 people rejecting the military‟s 
Documento Final.
53
 In September 1983, after this failed attempt to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for human rights violations, the Junta issued a National Pacification Law 
including a retrospective amnesty for human rights violations committed by both sides in the 
“Dirty War.”
54
 Effectively this amounted to an attempted self-amnesty for the military regime 
and its agents. This was heavily criticised by the human rights movement which organised 
massive protests against the National Pacification Law and the self-amnesty: on 19 August 
1983, 40 000 people marched in Buenos Aires protesting the proposed amnesty and on 21 
September 1983 between 8 000 and 15 000 protestors demonstrated for 24 hours in Buenos 
Aires demanding information on the “disappeared”.
55
 Despite these protests, the military 
passed the law implementing the amnesty on the eve of the return to civilian rule. 
 
2.3 The human rights movement and Alfonsin’s electoral campaign 
 
In the lead up to the democratic transition, at a stage when functioning political parties had 
not yet been fully restored, the civil society-based human rights movement played a quasi-
political role in denouncing the crimes of the junta and mobilising popular justice and truth 
concerns regarding the „disappearances‟, torture and other human rights abuses.
56
 In the 
context of 1983 election these human rights concerns could then be “transferred” from civil 
society-based movements to political parties now once again legitimately operating in the 
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public realm. One commentator observed that political parties “found their place in the sun, 




Against this background, the human rights issue of addressing past human rights violations 
by the military became pivotal to the electoral campaign of Raul Alfonsin‟s Radical Party 
Indeed Alfonsin‟s Radical Party, which up to the point of the elections had been a relatively 
small minority party compared to the Peronist tradition, was particularly outspoken on issues 
of human rights and also the need to address past human rights violations. In response to the 
human rights movement‟s popular demands for “truth and justice” these issues became 
central to Alfonsin‟s political campaign.
58
 The military‟s self-amnesty which had occasioned 
a popular outrage from the human rights movement became another key issue in the election 
campaigns. Alfonsin, who had a personal history of human rights activism himself, garnered 
the support of the human rights movement with promises to deal seriously with the human 
rights violations of the military junta. Included in his campaign was the promise to repeal the 
self-amnesty and put the military on trial.
59
 Reacting to the overwhelmingly positive public 
response to the Radical Party‟s human rights focus, many left-wing political parties, who had 
not previously considered the issue of human rights, now did so in acts of political 
opportunism.
60
 As one scholar says “when the electoral campaign began [the human rights 
movement] had successfully transformed the desparecidos into an issue that no political party 
could ignore or afford to negotiate.”
61
 The human rights movement thus „forced‟ the civilian 
politicians to address the truth and justice issues associated with the disappearances and other 




2.4 Establishing “truth” and “justice” during the transition 
 
In December 1983 the opposition Radical Party won the elections and Raul Alfonsin became 
president, marking the restoration of civilian rule in Argentine. True to the promises made in 
his election campaign, Alfonsin immediately annulled the military‟s self-amnesty and 
announced a “backward-looking programme” for dealing with the crimes of the military 
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 In the same month Alfonsin announced the setting up of an investigative truth 
commission to establish the truth about the disappeared and other human rights atrocities 
perpetrated by the military junta during the repression. Regarding the prosecution of 
perpetrators, Alfonsin devised a strategy that was less radical than the human rights 
movement had in mind in view of the potential threat of a destabilising military backlash. 
Already in this early announcement of measures to deal with the past there were signs of 
Alfonsin‟s attempt to limit the duration and the scope of the trials.
64
 Alfonsin announced that 
prosecutions would be directed at two categories of perpetrators: 1) the prosecution of top 
military officials and members of the Junta responsible for “giving out orders”, and 2) 
subordinates who had complied with orders that were so abhorrent that they could not be 




The human rights movement immediately criticised the government for limiting the number 
of prosecution and exempting too many perpetrators from responsibility. However, despite 
increasing criticism from the human rights movement Alfonsin continued to limit the scope 
of the trials in the face of the increasing threat of a possible backlash which could threaten 
stability and prospects of democratic consolidation. The next part of this chapter discusses 
these developments in detail focusing on the response of the human rights movement to these 
shifts in Alfonsin‟s policies regarding human rights atrocities. In particular the key question 
is to what extent the human rights community maintained its own principled human rights 
perspective on the amnesty/prosecutions issue throughout these events or came to accept 
different transitional justice perspectives as espoused by Alfonsin‟s shift in policies in 
response to the increasing threat of the military. 
 
2. 4. 1 Establishing the “truth” about the “disappeared” and tortured: CONADEP 
 
Following on from its demands for “truth”, the human rights movement had long been 
making calls for official investigations into the whereabouts of the “disappeared”. More 
specifically, the human rights movement lobbied for a bicameral parliamentary commission 
to investigate all human rights atrocities committed by the junta.
66
  In anticipation that the 
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government would set up an investigative truth commission many human rights organisations 
came together to form a “Technical Commission” and pooled all the data and reports relating 
to human rights violations collected during the repression. Responding to the human rights 
movement‟s demand for “truth”, Alfonsin created the National Commission on Disappeared 
Persons (CONADEP) by executive decree.
67
 While in favour of an investigative truth 
commission, the creation of CONADEP by executive decree was against the wishes of the 
human rights movement who had lobbied for a parliamentary commission.
68
  A parliamentary 
commission “would have been amenable to popular and human rights movement pressure 
through elected legislatures and would have had the power to subpoena accused repressors as 
witnesses.”
69
 However, this did not happen and instead CONADEP was created by executive 
decree with its members appointed directly by the President. According to Nino, the Alfonsin 
government “believed that a commission linked to Congress would give legislators an 





Most victims and human rights organisations, Las Madres in particular, initially objected to 
CONADEP for the reason that it was a non-representative body with a limited mandate 
merely to collect documentation as opposed to a truth commission with “real powers” of 
search and seizure to investigate new cases as they had hoped.
71
 While many human rights 
activists, at least initially, refused to participate in the Commission, in the end CONADEP 
relied heavily on the work of local human rights activists as it conducted its hearings 
throughout Argentine‟s fifteen provinces.
72
 In part this was due to efforts by the government 
to lobby members of the human rights movement for support of the commission.
73
 Indeed 
government was keen to secure the human rights community‟s cooperation with and support 
of CONADEP.
74
 Many organisations developed a “dual position” on the Commission in that 
“they cooperated with the Commission but publicly continued to call for the establishment of 
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a bicameral commission, with the same arguments they had used to oppose CONADEP.”
75
 
According to Brysk, many human rights organisations did eventually decide to participate in 
CONADEP but this decision brought about a “split” in the human rights movement between 
those organisations willing to work “within the system” as distinct from those that chose “to 
continue their role as outsiders.”
76
 Indeed, five of the ten appointees to the commission were 
prominent members of the human rights movement and in the end the human rights 




Unlike, the South African TRC, CONADEP was not a public truth commission and made its 
public debut only with the publication of the final Report, Nuncas Mas, after the Commission 
had disbanded.
78
 Despite the fact that CONADEP‟s hearings had not been public or reported 
in the media, members of the public, and the human rights movement in particular, had not 
forgotten about its existence. The release of the report was marked by a human rights 
demonstration of 70 000 in support of the “truth” represented by the release of the report.
79
 
Nuncas mas confirmed the disappearance of 8 963 people, acknowledged the existence of 
340 torture centres and listed the names of 1 351 people who had cooperated with the 
repression.
80
 The human rights movement criticised the eventual findings of the Commission 
arguing that the figures produced by the Commission did not represent the true figures of 
those disappeared which they alleged was closer to 30 000 than the Commission‟s 9000.  
 
2.4.2 Establishing justice for past human rights violations: criminal trials 
 
The second longstanding demand of the human rights movement that Alfonsin had to address 
was the demand to have the perpetrators of human rights atrocities brought to justice. The 
human rights movement demanded the punishment of all military officials involved in human 
rights violations. In the first months after the return to civilian rule, the human rights 
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movement brought cases to the civilian courts - by August 1984 more than 2000 cases had 
been lodged in the courts.
81
  By the end of the year 1984, CONADEP too had handed over 
1085 cases, identified through the Commission‟s work, to civilian judges. However, the 
progress of these cases was hampered by the new legislation requiring that cases involving 
military members should be dealt with by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and did 




As already mentioned, due to the underlying threat of a military backlash, Alfonsin adopted a 
self-limiting strategy for the prosecution of perpetrators.
83
 As part of this limited strategy 
Alfonsin made provision in February 1984 for the prosecution of members of the armed 
forces (those responsible for giving out orders) by their own military courts. This hampered 
the progress of cases that had initially been taken to the civil courts.
84
 Alfonsin‟s objective 
was to avoid a direct confrontation with the military by inviting them to take responsibility 
for prosecution of the perpetrators of human rights violations through the military courts. The 
move was severely criticised by the human rights movement who viewed the government‟s 
approach as “too conciliatory to the military”.
85
 Indeed, human rights lawyers fought to avoid 




Also, part of Alfonsin‟s limited strategy was to distinguish between different levels of 
culpability within the military, holding that those who had masterminded human rights 
violations should be tried first. To this end, part of Alfonsin's strategy was to try nine military 
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heads of the junta in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  Human rights groups 
outrightly rejected Alfonsin‟s limited strategy: 
 
The human rights groups‟ stance toward retroactive justice was intransigently retributive. 
They sought to punish each and every person responsible for the abuses regardless of their 
degree of involvement. They held a Kantian view of punishment; even if society were at the 




As predicted by the human rights movement, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
failed to proceed timeously and efficiently with prosecutions.  As a result, and with mounting 
pressure from the human rights movement to proceed with prosecutions of the nine military 
officers and other cases that had been handed over to the military courts, the government 
handed jurisdiction for the prosecutions over to the civil courts whose legal proceedings were 
initiated in April 1985.
88
 By December 1985, nine heads of the military juntas were convicted 




The trial which took place in the course of 1985 was popularly supported by the human rights 
movement and citizens; when a coup plot was discovered just before the trial, more than 250 
000 people demonstrated in support of the trials.
90
 The trial was open to the public and 
extensively reported in the press: it was keenly followed by members of the human rights 
movement as well as the broader public, and not least by the President and the military.
91
 
Certainly, the human rights movement continued to mobilise around the issue of legal 
accountability with continued activism and by offering extensive assistance to the 
prosecution in the trial. Members of human rights organisations actively participated in the 
military trials by providing information required for the investigations, by working with the 
prosecutor to identify leading cases, by acting as a liaison between victims and the courts, by 
locating victims and generally enabling the proceedings of the prosecution.
92
 Sustained 
activism ensured that the imperative of punishing those guilty of human rights violations 
remained the pertinent and relevant issue at stake in the trial. Throughout the trial the 
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constant chanting of castigo a todos los culpables [punish all of the guilty] could be heard 




At the end of the trial in December 1985, the popular desire for justice in Argentina had not 
been quelled, as the executive had hoped, but rather it had intensified.
94
 Many from the 
human rights movement thought the sentences were too lenient, especially Las Madres who 
led a court room protest.
95
 The human rights movement saw the trial, which the government 
had hoped would be merely exemplary, as an opening for further prosecutions of military 
officers at other ranks as well.
96
 Indeed, the Trial of the Junta pointed to many other cases 
that needed to be investigated. In the judgment handed down the judge noted that, having 
been presented with 9000 legally proven crimes and having made only 5 convictions, the 




In response to the human rights agenda as determined by the popular support for the human 
rights movement the civilian courts continued to independently initiate further prosecutions. 
However, due to the excessive number of cases and the increasing threats of a possible 
military backlash it wasn‟t long before the Alfonsin government realised that it had made 
promises of judicial accounting that it couldn‟t keep.
98
 In December 1986 the government 
attempted to put restrictions on the escalating number of prosecutions by introducing the 
„Full Stop Law” which set a sixty-day limit for submitting charges to the courts (the first 
thirty days of which fell in January, Argentines‟ vacation period), extinguishing those that 
didn‟t make the deadline. The Full Stop Law did not accomplish what the government had 
hoped and actually proved to be counterproductive as more cases continued to be brought 
before the courts amongst massive protest demonstrations led by the human rights 
movement.
99
 Furthermore, the judiciary was unexpectedly cooperative in processing cases 
even over the traditional vacation period. During the second week of December 1986, the 
human rights movement led a demonstration of more than 50 000 protesting against the Full 
Stop Law.
100
 While the legislation was being debated, one human rights organisation staged a 
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simulacrum of a concentration camp at the entrance of Parliament.
101
 Former CONADEP 
commissioners as well as the undersecretary of human rights within the Ministry of the 
Interior who was charged with “finishing CONADEP‟s work” after its dissolution, also spoke 
out against the proposal.
102
 As did the judiciary: members of the appeals court that had tried 
the juntas resigned in protest. It is clear that the human rights perspective on the prosecutions 
as a principled human rights issue found popular support at this conjuncture. 
 
In the end, the Punto Final became law on 22 December 1986 and prevented the prosecution 
of the majority of cases that had been identified.
103
 However, the judiciary continued to 
process the cases already handed over by the human rights movement at a record pace.
104
 
Owing to the human rights movement and the willing judiciary, there were still several 
hundred cases in which officers could be tried. The result of this unexpected development 
was that the military, including senior and middle-ranking officers, remained fearful that they 
would still be prosecuted. Contrary to objectives of the Punto Final Law, military threats of a 
possible backlash actually grew presenting a serious political and security threat to Alfonsin‟s 
civilian government.
 105
    In April 1987, a military rebellion, the “Easter Rebellion”, in 
opposition to the trials developed and eventually forced Alfonsin‟s civilian government to 
back down with a further attempt to limit the prosecutions.
106
 The government passed the 
“Due Obedience Law” in June 1987 ruling that lower level officers could not be prosecuted if 
they had acted in terms of superior orders. HROs were outraged at the new laws and 
immediately counteracted the attempts to limit the trials with protests and also litigation, 
appealing to the courts to have legislation declared unconstitutional.
107
 In its first legal 
challenge in the federal courts, on 11 June 1987, just three days after its promulgation, the 
law was declared unconstitutional. However, later on in the month, 27 June 1987, the 
Supreme Court overruled this judgement declaring that the due obedience law did not violate 
the constitution.
108
 Following the application of the due obedience law only approximately 
fifty of the several hundred cases that survived the Punto Final legislation could be tried.
109
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The relationship between the human rights movement and the Radical Party grew 
increasingly adversarial as the Alfonsin government developed its own approach to 
transitional justice issues of amnesty and prosecution which was no longer in line with a 
principled human rights perspective. However, from 1987, the human rights movement was 
less effective in its ability to impact on the transitional justice process. Despite this, the 
human rights movement did not modify its own principled human rights perspective on the 
issue of amnesty and prosecutions to come into line with Alfonsin‟s more pragmatic 
approach. The human rights movement continued to protest the Punto Final Law and the Due 
Obedience Law in terms of its own principled human rights perspective. 
 
The above account of the Argentine transition suggests the independent role of a civil society 
based human rights movement which had a significant impact on the agenda of the 1983 
elections and during 1984 to the end of 1986 effectively sustained a specifically “human 
rights” agenda focused on establishing truth and justice for human rights atrocities committed 
by the military junta. By means of widespread lobbying and sustained advocacy for human 
rights the human rights movement played a key role in placing issues of truth and justice on 
the national agenda in the first place.  
 
In subsequent years the issue of prosecutions and amnesty/pardon for human rights atrocities 
has remained an unresolved and contentious issue in Argentine society and politics. 
Subsequent to this initial transition period further pardons were introduced under President 
Menem in the period 1989 to 2000. More recently however there was a successful appeal 
against the amnesty laws under President Kirchner who displayed a renewed commitment to 
truth and justice for past human rights violations during the period 2000 to the present. 
Despite many setbacks, which came as a major disappointment to the human rights 
movement against a background of high hopes for retributive justice as promised by the 
Alfonsin government, the human rights community has continued and continues to bring 
cases of human rights violations to the courts.
110
 As recently as 22 December 2010, former 
dictator and leader of the coup that installed the 1976-1983 dictatorship, Jorge Videla, was 
sentenced to life in prison for the torture and murder of thirty-one prisoners.
111
 Prosecutions 
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such as this one have been made possible by the decision of the Supreme Court in 2007 to 
overturn the amnesties granted under President Menem.  
  
2.4.3 Assessing the nature and impact of the Argentine human rights movement 
 
The above account suggests a number of considerations for understanding the principled 
human rights response of the human rights movement to the issue of amnesty and 
prosecutions in the transition. The lack of an identifiable human rights tradition prior to the 
1976 coup in Argentine suggests that the emergence of the human rights movement during 
the repression and in the early 1980s amounted to a primarily contextual response to the 
military junta. Certainly, the context of the government‟s clandestine operations in the course 
of which thousands of people “disappeared” prompted an extensive call for the truth as to the 
fate of these individuals. The human rights movement‟s demand for prosecutions was also 
likely a response to the systematic denial by the military of the disappearances, torture and 
killings.  
 
Another factor is the structural context of gross human rights violations by the military 
regime as crimes committed by individual state agents, against individual dissidents, 
amenable to criminal prosecution. In this regards, Rosenberg argues that the torture and 
disappearances committed in the Latin American dictatorships as individual and direct acts of 
human rights atrocities were more amenable to criminal prosecution than the systemic 
complicity in human rights violations typical of the Eastern European Communist regimes.
112
 
The nature of the crimes committed under the military juntas was such that “one can point to 
a few hundred men who committed the actual crimes.”
113
   
 
In the context of Argentina where human rights violations were perpetrated against targeted 
individuals these human rights violations also primarily concerned individual civil and 
political rights or first-generation rights (as opposed to second-generation, socio-economic 
rights). Accordingly, criminal prosecutions were an appropriate response to human rights 
violations such as murder, torture and kidnappings – the courts were a place where these 
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rights could be dealt with. Smulovitz commented on the impact of the judicial trials in the 
discourse of human rights in Argentine that it reinforced popular perceptions of the political 
significance of rights and justice: 
 
The spectacular character of the trial, in which weak citizens held powerful individuals 
accountable for past violations, helped to build an image of a judiciary that could discipline 
the powerful and defend the rights of the weak . . . The decision of the Buenos Aires Federal 
Court made the courts the stage upon which the promise of the newborn democracy was to be 
fulfilled. The political impact and high visibility of this decision began to transform 
perceptions of the traditionally subordinate role of the judiciary. As a result of this 
„spectacular‟ and „unexpected‟ public event, the conservative judiciary appeared to become a 




The account in this chapter also points to the role of the Argentine criminal justice system as 
an available mechanism for „justice‟ through criminal prosecution. The judiciary cooperated 
with processing complaints submitted to the courts and was available to investigate and take 
up such cases against the military. In the case of South Africa we shall see that the judiciary 
was generally unwilling to take on such cases. But then these cases weren‟t brought to the 
courts in the same volume as by the Argentine human rights movement.  
 
The particular chronological sequence of events relating to the interactions and relations 
between the political parties and the human rights movement had an impact on the agenda for 
prosecutions and retroactive justice in Argentine during the transition. The account of 
Argentine in this chapter points to a situation whereby the relationship between the human 
rights movement and the soon to be installed civilian government was cooperative in the 
lead-up to the transition, the civilian government having received the large part of its support 
base as a result of popular mobilisation led by the human rights movement.  The result of this 
was an executive that was amenable to the demands of the human rights movement and that, 
at the insistence of the human rights movement, adopted “pro” human rights policies.
115
 
However, with time, the relationship between the two grew increasingly adversarial as the 
government began to factor in relevant strategic and political considerations such as political 
stability and the military threat. As mentioned earlier, there was a parting of the agendas of 
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the new civilian government and the human rights movement which can be explained by the 
different relevant considerations faced by each actor in the context of the transition. The 
Alfonsin government had to reckon with the military‟s likely response to prosecutions who 
was still a power in the land and who posed a threat to the new and precarious civilian 
government. In adopting its strategy for a limited approach to justice, the Alfonsin 
government was evidently motivated by the need to take into account these strategic and 
political considerations. The relevant considerations of the human rights movement however 
were not those concerned with the political implications of policy decisions but rather with 
the objectives of truth about the disappeared and justice for the perpetrators of human rights 
atrocities. Their considerations were therefore more concerned with justice as a principled 
issue. The human rights movement generally maintained their “independent” base from 
government and continued to insist on a more comprehensive approach to truth and justice 
than the Alfonsin government implemented.  
 
Taking the Argentine case into account, the rest of the thesis goes on to investigate the 
approach of the South African human rights community to the issue of truth and justice for 
human rights violations. To what extent were the issues of truth and retributive justice a 
priority for the South African human rights community as they were for the human rights 
movement in Argentine? To what extent did the South African human rights community 
insist upon retributive justice in the same way that the Argentine human rights community 
did, if at all? To what extent was the SA human rights community‟s response shaped by a 
contextual response to the particular exigencies at the time of the transition? Can we see the 
SA human rights community‟s response as a response to a different kind of human rights 
situation with different transitional justice concerns in the context of apartheid‟s overall 

















CHAPTER 3: INDEMNITY IN THE EARLY TRANSITIONAL PHASE AND IN THE 
LEAD-UP TO THE POSTAMBLE, 1990-1993 
 
 
This chapter investigates the extent to which the South African human rights community in 
the lead-up to the transition, and while political negotiations were underway during 1990-
1992, took an interest in the imminent problem of “dealing with the past” of human rights 
violations in South Africa. This is meant to serve as background and context for the more 
specific question of the human rights community‟s concerns with amnesty and prosecutions 
for human rights atrocities. What form did its concern with transitional justice take and how 
did the human rights community‟s response translate into action?  
 
Before focusing more specifically on the SA human rights community‟s concerns with the 
issues of amnesty and prosecution at this time these need to be contextualized within its more 
general approach to transitional justice. Significantly, at the onset of the transition the SA 
human rights community was concerned with a range of transitional justice-type issues such 
as recovering and exposing the truth about the past through investigations, the need for post-
conflict and national reconciliation, material reparations, the transformation of the economy 
and socio-economic development. This suggests that they may have had other priorities than 
just that of the legal accountability of perpetrators of human rights violations under apartheid. 
What were these priorities and how can they be understood within the context of the South 
African transition? More generally, how did members of the human rights community view 
their role as human rights organisations and activists in the context of the political transition 
from apartheid to a new democracy? And how does this response compare to the mobilisation 
of the human rights movement in Argentine around retributive justice and prosecutions at a 
similar stage of their transition?   
 
3.1 The human rights community’s perception of its role in the impending transition 
 
When it became publicly known that negotiations between the NP and the ANC were 
underway, human rights organisations began to review the focus of their work in light of the 
changing political terrain. Organisations such as the Black Sash, Lawyers for Human Rights 
and the Legal Resources Centre deliberately reconsidered their past functions and future role 















Africa. What issues were priorities for the human rights community at this early stage of the 
„transition‟? To what extent was the human rights community at that stage concerned with 
issues of human rights in the general context of transitional justice, and more specifically 
with the question of prosecutions versus amnesty for perpetrators of human rights violations? 
On closer investigation it soon appears that, at least to begin with, the issue of ensuring legal 
accountability for perpetrators of human rights atrocities was not a particular priority for the 
human rights community. At this early stage the issues that the human rights community was 
most prominently concerned with were:  
1) The ongoing social and economic injustices and general human rights violations 
that black people continued to suffer under apartheid;  
2) The debate over a future Bill of Rights in a new Constitution for a democratic 
South Africa; and  
3) the escalating violence in especially the KZN, Vaal and East Rand regions and the 
“peace process” at the level of local communities and regions that happened parallel 
to the political negotiations as a response to the violence 
 
We will briefly consider each of these before turning to the human rights community‟s more 
specific concerns with transitional justice and its response to the issue of amnesty and 
prosecutions in particular. 
 
Articles from various organisational publications and their annual reports reveal how the SA 
human rights community conceived of its changing role and main priorities on the eve of the 
transition. For example, a 1990 issue of the Black Sash‟s publication Sash featured an article 
by Mary Burton (who later served as a commissioner of the TRC Committee) discussing the 
Black Sash‟s future role in South Africa.
116
 Burton listed as priorities for the organisation the 
problems of „dismantling apartheid‟, of instilling a democratic culture in South Africa 
through education, and addressing the injustices caused by apartheid including economic 
disadvantages, the lack of education and employment opportunities, the lack of social 
services and social welfare. Subsequent issues of Sash in 1990 and 1991 reflected the Black 
Sash‟s prioritisation of the role of women in the future South Africa (in governance and in the 
economy), black schooling, human development, housing issues and the „land question‟. 
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Broadly this prioritised the ongoing social and economic injustices and general human rights 
violations that black people continued to suffer under apartheid 
 
Similarly, in its Annual Report for the year ending March 1991, the LRC expressed its plans 
to engage with new areas and opportunities as the changing political situation in SA 
developed.
117
 It envisaged itself playing a role in „transforming the rule of law‟; in 
developing a new Constitution and Bill of Rights for South Africa constructed by „ordinary 
people‟; and assisting with the creation of a „legal framework for development‟ in the 
country. At this time the LRC planned to deepen its focus on development issues around land 
and housing and accordingly plans were made to set up a „development fund‟ for this. An 
analysis of case files opened by the LRC for the year ending March 1992 shows that most of 
these concerned issues of land, housing development, labour and consumer protection. Cases 
for civil damages against the Minister of Law and Order for misconduct by state police and 
security forces also constituted part of the LRC‟s case load. These are discussed in the second 
part of the chapter. The Report however indicated that the LRC had devoted the most 
substantial part of its time to representing individuals and communities in cases involving 





Speaking at the Human Rights Trust‟s annual “Human Rights Festival” at the end of 1990, 
National Director of LHR, Brian Currin, flagged second-generation rights as the most 
important of issues that confronted the SA „human rights movement‟ in the immediate 
future.
119
 Currin also wrote in the LHR‟s Annual Report for the year ending June 1991 that 





While Idasa cannot be said to be a legal human rights organisation in the same sense as the 
LRC and LHR, its publication Democracy in Action provided a good reflection of issues 
debated and on the agenda of not only civil society but also the South African human rights 
community at this time. Furthermore, Alex Boraine, who became a key instigator and role 
player in the debate over transitional justice in South Africa, was the Director of Idasa in the 
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early 1990s before he left this position to set up the NGO „Justice in Transition‟. However, 
while Boraine was still at Idasa he had begun to form ideas about the problem of “dealing 
with the past” in South Africa In as early as 1990 Idasa held conferences and workshops on 
“South Africa in transition.” One such workshop, called “SA in Transition” was hosted by 
Idasa in June 1990 and attended by 300 delegates. The conference discussed the “political 
transition process and specifically the lessons from transitions in Latin America and Southern 
Europe” but focused on the dynamics of the negotiations process as well as the “key” 
problem of effecting not just a political transition but socio-economic transformation and 
“meeting the needs of the disadvantaged” in South Africa.
121
 As with the other „human 
rights‟ publications at this time, the majority of articles in Democracy in Action honed in on 
the problem of socio-economic development and the serious socio-economic ills suffered by 
black people and communities as a result of the apartheid system as well as widespread 




It was with these concerns in mind that the human rights community and civil society 
actively participated in the debate over a bill of rights for South Africa. Central to the debate 
was the issue of whether/how socio-economic rights should be included in the proposed new 
Bill of Rights, and the issue of how these rights would be realised for the majority of South 
Africans.
123
 Some key contributions to the debate appeared in A Charter for Social Justice: A 
Contribution to the South African Bill of Rights which was a collection of essays and 
included contributions from Hugh Corder, and Steve Kahanovitz amongst other human rights 
proponents and academics.
124
 John Dugard, a prominent human rights figure in South Africa, 
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made an early contribution to the debate with his journal article “A Bill of Rights for South 
Africa.”
125
 Human rights scholar and lawyer,
126
 Albie Sachs‟s widely circulated publications 
reflected many of the most important issues at stake for „human rights‟ once a political 
settlement had been achieved.
127
 His books Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa 
and Advancing Rights in South Africa published in 1990 and 1992 focused on the role of law 
in social transformation and represented a significant contribution from a prominent ANC-
based human rights activist. Significantly, the issue of legal accountability and prosecutions 
for perpetrators of human rights violations during apartheid did not feature as one such 
„problem.‟
128
 Rather, the book considered a prospective democratic order based on a 
Constitution and Bill or Rights with a strong emphasis on second-generation social and 
economic rights.
129
  In keeping with other members of the human rights community at the 
time, Sachs considered the most important issues facing South Africa as those of correcting 
the socio-economic injustices of the past, the problem of land and property rights, the 
organisation of civil society, affirmative action and also a possible Bill of Rights as part of 
the new Constitution.  
 
The range of articles published in the South African Human Rights Journal around this time 
also reflected the human rights community‟s preoccupation with socio-economic rights in the 
„new‟ South Africa and in a future Bill of Rights and Constitution. In his editorial for the 20
th
 
Anniversary edition of the South African Journal of Human Rights in 2004, John Dugard 
remarked that in the early 1990s journal articles had centred on “the constitutional debate.”
130
  
Certainly many contributions to the SAJHR during this time were centred on the debates a 
prospective Bill of Rights and the future role of a new Constitution and a constitutional court 
in South Africa. The predominant „rights‟ discourse around this time was therefore located 
within the more general concern of overcoming the legacy of an apartheid South Africa 
which had been entrenched as a system of racial discrimination and the systemic derogation 
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of citizens‟ political, social and economic rights. This was quite unlike the case in Argentine 
where the discourse was predominantly centred on the rights of victims to know the truth 
about the disappeared as well as their right to retributive justice for human rights atrocities. 
 
The third major focus of human rights organisations during the early period of the political 
negotiations was the ongoing and increasing political violence in certain parts of South 
Africa, KwaZulu Natal and the East Rand in particular.
131
 There was genuine concern among 
the human rights community and civil society that the violence was spiralling out of control 
and that it could derail the “peace process”.
132
 Human rights and civil society organisations 
became involved in behind the scenes mediation and facilitation in these risk areas.
133
 Civil 
society and the business sector also came together to implement a National Peace 
Accord…“a civil society initiative that brought political actors from all sides together to 
establish codes of conduct needed for the initiated transition to be saved.”
134
  In terms of the 
Accord, a countrywide network of conflict mediation and monitoring committees made up of 
representatives of the signatories to the Accord and of civil society was created.
135
 Human 
rights organisations actively participated in these processes. The focus of these committees 
was not on holding perpetrators legally accountable for human rights abuses but rather 
seeking a solution to the increasing political violence on the ground.  
 
Indeed, the late 1980s and early 1990s was a period of intensive political violence in South 
Africa.
136
 Liberal and human rights organisations such as the Human Rights Commission and 
the SA Institute of Race Relations had been prominent in monitoring and publicising covert 
government operations in torture and detention camps as well as “deaths in detention” by 
police officers. The LRC and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies contributed to a 
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substantial “Human Rights Index” published in the quarterly issues of the SAJHR.
137
 The 
Vrye Weekblad, an alternative news publication, played a key role in exposing “death 
squads” in the security forces which lead to the Harms and the Goldstone Commissions 
which are discussed below. At the same time the issue of past political atrocities also 
emerged as an internal issue in the ANC, resulting in two internal commissions of enquiry 
into human rights atrocities that had occurred in ANC military camps in Angola and Zambia. 
The human rights community did take note of and become involved in these developments, 
some of which are discussed below. However, this was not necessarily with a view to 
accountability for such human rights violations but rather with a view to condemning and 
rejecting any involvement in the violence.
138
 In general, while “human rights” were a major 
concern at this time for the human rights community, this was within a context shaped by 
other general priorities for the SA human rights community that did not specifically focus on 
the criminal prosecution of perpetrators of apartheid human rights violations.   
 
Even in the months leading up to the Postamble of the Interim Constitution (which would 
announce the provision of amnesty as part of the negotiated settlement at the end of 1993 the 
main priority of these organisations continued to concern issues of socio-economic 
development and a new Bill of Rights. This focus on socio-economic rights eclipsed a 
principled human rights concern with amnesty versus criminal prosecution for human rights 
violations committed during apartheid. So, despite the impending transition, human rights 
organisations such as the LHR, LRC, Black Sash and other human rights organisations did 
not prioritise the issue of accountability for the human rights atrocities committed during 
apartheid to the same extent as other projects that dealt with socio-economic issues facing 
South Africans. The one exception to this was Boraine who had already begun to 
conceptualise the NGO Justice in Transition. Even so, this initiative was not conceived in 
terms of retributive justice or accountability but rather as a victim-oriented truth process. 
There is no evidence certainly in the news and media reports that these organisations, or 
others, campaigned in any sustained way for accountability of perpetrators of human rights 
violations. Instead, the trend towards projects around issues of socio-economic rights and 
development continued.  
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This did not mean that these human rights organisations did not develop considered views on 
the issue of amnesty for human rights violations at all. The controversies around the Further 
Indemnity Act from late 1992 on did provoke public stands from key human rights 
organisations on the prospect of a general amnesty well before the publication of the 
Postamble of the Interim Constitution at the end of 1993.  
 
3.2 Addressing human rights violations: truth processes, civil actions and attempted 
prosecutions 
 
In the early 1990s the SA human rights community did become increasingly concerned with 
the nature and extent of political violence and human rights violations, and how these should 
be dealt with in the context of the transition. At this stage these concerns took at least three 
main forms: 
1) truth processes: maintaining monitoring bodies and calling for investigative 
commissions focused on general trends of human rights violations; 
2) civil actions: initiating litigation regarding particular cases of human rights 
violations; and  
3) accountability and retributive justice: advocating for criminal prosecutions of 
prominent perpetrators of human rights violations. 
We will briefly discuss each of these in turn as background to a more specific account of the 
human rights community‟s approach to the issue of amnesty and indemnities in the next sub-
section. 
 
A number of NGOs in apartheid South Africa were involved in and/or were set up to monitor 
and record the human rights situation in South Africa. Going back the 1960s the South 
African Institute of Race Relations had monitored and reported on deaths in detention, state 
repression and human rights violations on a regular basis.
139
 The CSVR was also involved in 
this and had a project within its organisation for the monitoring of political violence. The 
Human Rights Commission was established in 1988 as a civil society institution with the 
stated brief to investigate, monitor and publicise human rights violations in South Africa with 
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special emphasis on repressive measures exercised by the state.
140
 Other organisations 
involved in monitoring and reporting human rights violations included the Independent Board 
of Inquiry and legal human rights organisations such as the LRC, LHR etc. The background 
to this was the extensive involvement of human rights lawyers in representing the accused in 




Several official investigative commissions were established over the years 1990-1992, 
including the Harms Commission, the Goldstone Commission and the Hiemstra Commission 
as well as various inquests such as the inquest into the „Trust Feed Massacre‟, to investigate 
increasing political violence and human rights violations as well as allegations that a „third-
force‟ and state hit-squad operatives were instigating the violence (especially in relation to 
the ongoing violence in KwaZulu Natal). Many human rights lawyers, particularly from the 
LHR and the LRC were actively involved in these Commissions, assisting with the 
investigations and presenting evidence as well as participating in the hearings. As part of one 
its national programmes in 1992/1993 – „Commissions and Monitoring of Violence‟ – the 
LHR published information that emerged from the Harms Commission about state 
paramilitary hit squads.
142
  The Legal Resources Centre teamed up with the Human Rights 
Commission in 1991 to produce a comprehensive report of political violence and killings in 
Natal by the KwaZulu (Natal) Police for the use of the Goldstone Commission.
143
 The LRC 
worked closely with the Goldstone Commission and in particular with its Natal investigation 
arm.
144
 It should be mentioned that the credibility of the commissions varied and so 
accordingly the approach of the human rights community to each commission also varied 
with the Harms Commission being very controversial but the Goldstone Commission widely 
supported. 
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In the absence of any response from the Attorneys-General regarding calls to institute 
prosecutions against those implicated in the Harms and Goldstone Commissions, both the 
LHR and the LRC opened a number of cases filing for civil damages on behalf of victims of 
the police and state security forces. In respect of the Goldstone Commission, close to 100 
actions against the Minister of Law and Order were instituted for damages caused to the 
victims and their families.
145
 In 1992, the LRC opened 94 new case files for damages against 
the Minister of Law and Order for unlawful arrests, assaults, shootings and killings by police 
which were at this stage all increasing occurrences.
146
 These actions for civil claims against 
perpetrators of abuses must be differentiated from criminal prosecutions against individuals 
as the main objective of the civil claims was to claim compensation from the perpetrators for 
damages suffered as a result of unlawful actions against victims.  
 
Significantly some of the human rights organisations expressed the view that prosecutions 
should follow on from the commissions of inquiry. The LHR for example was concerned as 
to what these investigative commissions meant for the prospect of prosecutions for human 
rights violations: “LHR would like to see the Government thoroughly investigate the 
activities of the police force as a whole and the prosecution of those who have committed 
offences.”
147
 In an article in the February 1991 issue of LHR‟s journal Rights entitled 
„Commissions of Inquiry: Where to From Here?‟ David Dison, a human rights lawyer who 
had represented affected parties in the Harms, Goldstone and Hiemstra Commissions, 
suggested that prosecutions should be instituted in respect of the murders of activists such as 
David Webster and Anton Lubowski.
148
 While Dison articulated a clear statement of a 
principled human rights commitment to criminal prosecution, and an implied rejection of 
amnesty, this was Dison‟s own view and to what extent his stand was more widely shared 
within the LHR is not clear.  
 
The LRC did contend that the investigative Commissions should lead to prosecutions. 
However, as the LRC reported in its 1992/1993 Annual Report, representations by the LRC 
to the Attorneys-General regarding prosecutions of policemen and state security forces were 
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“not often met with success.”
149
  Despite these murmurs from the LRC and the LHR that 
investigative commissions should be followed by prosecutions, the issue was not pursued by 
the human rights community through public campaigns or sustained activism and was 
certainly not comparable to the Argentine human rights movement. Our conclusion must be 
that at this stage the issue does not appear to have been flagged as a major priority for the 
human rights community in the context of the transition.  
 
3.3 The Indemnity Acts and the issue of amnesty for human rights violations  
 
At what stage and in what ways did the issue of amnesty for human rights violations become 
a more significant concern for the SA human rights community? Against the background of 
its more general concerns with different issues of transitional justice as well as its growing 
involvement with how human rights violations should be dealt with in the context of the 
transition, this section will reconstruct how amnesty for human rights violations became a 
more prominent issue for the human rights community in relation to the Indemnity Acts.  
 
While at the end of 1993 a provision for amnesty was incorporated in the Postamble of the 
Interim Constitution as a final outcome of the negotiated settlement, this was not the first 
time that the issue of amnesty emerged in the political and public domain during the 
transitional period in South Africa. That had occurred in relation to the Further Indemnity Act 
from late 1992. The first Indemnity Act (no. 35 of 1990) was passed in 1990 but, as discussed 
in the Introduction, did not serve to grant impunity to perpetrators of human rights atrocities 
but rather to allow for political exiles to return to the country and/or be released from jail so 
that some of these individuals could engage in negotiations with the government over a new 
democratic South Africa. The stated purpose of the indemnity to encourage negotiations was 
well received by the human rights community who at this stage fully supported an indemnity 
of this sort for the purpose of reaching a negotiated solution. A working group was 
established to make recommendations on the definition of “political offences” in the South 
African situation. The working group made use of the Norgaard principles and in defining an 
act as political considered whether the act was committed “in the course of or as part of a 
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political uprising or disturbance” or “committed in the execution of an order or with the 
approval of the organisation, institution or body concerned.”
150
  The defence of “superior 
orders” in this first Indemnity Act is not particularly problematic from a human rights 
perspective as the indemnity did not apply to human rights atrocities.   
 
Following the Indemnity Act and also the Pretoria and Groote Schuur Minutes, direct 
negotiations over a democratic South Africa founded on a new constitution began a year later 
in December 1991 when the first Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was 
set in motion.  However, despite the implementation of the first Indemnity Act of 1990 the 
ANC contended that members of the liberation struggle were still incarcerated as political 
prisoners. This became a major issue in the attempts to resume the constitutional negotiations 
which had broken down in May 1992. It was settled in the Record of Understanding (RoU) 
signed by the ANC and the NP on 25 September 1992 enabling the constitutional 
negotiations (CODESA II) to resume soon after -- but only partially. In the Record of 
Understanding, the parties agreed that “all prisoners whose imprisonment is related to 
political conflict of the past and whose release can make a contribution to reconciliation 
should be released.”
151
 They also recorded their disagreement on this issue of the release of 
political prisoners convicted of gross human rights violations:  
 
The government and the ANC agreed that the release of prisoners, namely, those who 
according to the ANC fall within the guidelines defining political offences, but according to 
the government do not, and who have committed offences with a political motive on or before 
8 October 1990 shall be carried out in stages (as reflected in a separate document; 
'Implementation Programme: Release of Prisoners') and be completed before 15 November 
1992.
152
   
 
Shortly after the RoU was signed, in October 1992, a second indemnity was legislated known 
as the Further Indemnity Act (no. 152 of 1992).  
 
The Further Indemnity Act was more controversial not least in that it effectively amounted to 
a provision of amnesty (and thus impunity) for perpetrators of gross violations of human 
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rights in so far as some of the prisoners to be released had been convicted of gross human 
rights violations. From a human rights perspective this inevitably had to raise principled 
objections, despite ostensible claims from politicians that the indemnity would contribute to 
„reconciliation.‟
153
 At the root of the controversy was that the Further Indemnity Act adopted 
a wider definition of „political offences‟ with the result that perpetrators of gross human 
rights violations could henceforth be considered for indemnity.
154
 However, the definition of 
“political offences” as a criterion justifying human rights violations also has significance in 
that it went directly against the core Nuremberg principle that “superior orders” or the 
defence of “political offences” did not justify human rights violations. Although the Norgaard 
principles did not explicitly refer to “superior orders” in terms of receiving orders within an 
institutional chain of command, the political objective criterion meant that committing human 
rights violations in furtherance of political objectives was an „acceptable‟ ground for 
indemnity. 
 
There were allegations, in the media and from some political quarters, that the Further 
Indemnity was an attempt by the National Party to secure amnesty for its own members and 
for the security forces and the police who were responsible for human rights violations and 
that it was doing so under the guise of the indemnities it claimed would benefit members of 
the ANC.
 155
 Whether these allegations were true or not, the point is that the objectives of the 
Further Indemnity Act were presented in this way in the media and by some political actors 
and so sparked debates and discussions around the issues of possible (self-)amnesty versus 
prosecutions for human rights atrocities in the context of the impending political transition.  
  
Certainly, this issue did elicit a response from the human rights community whose 
representatives in numerous opinion pieces in the media condemned any prospect of a 
„general amnesty‟.
156
 The human rights community condemned a „general amnesty‟ for two 
main reasons. One reason was the secrecy that surrounded the process of granting the 
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indemnities which, instead of aiding truth recovery, would deny the public knowledge of the 
perpetrators and the crimes for which applicants would receive indemnity. For example, in 
response to the announcement of the Further Indemnity, Dennis Davis of the Wits 
University‟s Centre for Applied Legal Research wrote in his regular column „Benchmarks‟ in 
the Weekly Mail, that the Further Indemnity Act allowed for “a range of people to be 
indemnified without the public ever having the opportunity of acquiring knowledge of a 
significant part of South African history.”
157
 The secret process could not be considered to 
meet “the requirements of a civilised, decent legal system.” Brian Currin, National Director 
of the LHR, argued a similar point: “a blanket indemnity against prosecution is a denial of the 
right of South Africans to their history.”
158
 Currin added, “We say this not in retributive ire, 
but in the belief that we have a right to know the nameless and faceless torturers and 





In its response to the Further Indemnity Act the Black Sash also argued that all South 
Africans had a “right and duty to know the truth about the past” and that amnesties could not 
be granted without full investigation.
160
 The Black Sash contested that granting amnesty 
without full investigation and disclosure would mean that “past wounds would remain 
unhealed, and important concepts of justice and responsibility would be devalued.”
161
 
Although the Black Sash did not elaborate on this idea at the time, the claim reveals 
assumptions about the important role of the truth about past political atrocities in healing as 
well as in contributing to „justice‟ and „responsibility‟ too.
162
  Saying that justice required 
prosecutions, the Black Sash rejected the prospect of a general amnesty for the main reason 




The second reason why human rights organisations rejected the Further Indemnity Act at this 
stage was because the indemnity was to be granted by the National Party government as an 
effective self-amnesty. It was contested that the NP had no „right‟ to grant indemnity for 
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crimes and human rights violations committed by their own members. In other words, the 
human rights community took a principled stand against the National Party government 
granting itself an effective self-amnesty. In an opinion article published in the Weekend 
Argus, the Black Sash voiced its opposition to a general self-amnesty by the National Party:  
 
Above all, it should be remembered that those who are guilty have no right to indemnify 
themselves. When the possibility of an amnesty is discussed, it is those who suffered who 
should set the terms – not those who are guilty and, through the mechanisms of indemnity, 




Currin from the LHR also argued that amnesty could only be considered by a democratically 
elected and legitimate dispensation.
165
 Immediately after the Further Indemnity Act was 
signed into force, one hundred and forty-nine prisoners were released under the Act without 
any formal process.
166
 Two particularly controversial releases were the releases of Barend 
Strydom and Robert McBride, both of whom committed serious human rights violations 
including murder. 
 
The Further Indemnity Act came under increasing criticism as the indemnity process 
unfolded. The secrecy of the process was criticised not only because it inherently thwarted 
the objective of truth recovery but also because there was no monitoring of the process itself, 
or of decisions about who was granted indemnity and for what crimes. Instead, decisions 
about indemnity were at the sole discretion of President FW de Klerk. In 1993 Jody Kollapen 
from the LHR, in an important article reflecting ongoing debates within the human rights 
community, criticised the indemnity process for the fact that the entire application process 
and mechanisms were secret, that the public was not entitled to receive information about the 
process, that no provision was made for victims or interested parties to place their cases 
before the President, and that the definition of „act with a political objective‟ was so wide that 
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In the context of the releases under the Further Indemnity Act, LHR developed its position on 
the issue of amnesty not only in this context but also on a possible general amnesty in the 
broader context of the transitional negotiations. In particular, a position paper produced by 
the LHR on the issue of a general amnesty in its August 1993 edition of Rights is worth 
taking a close look at.
168
  The LHR firstly offered reasons why it would not accept a general 
amnesty and then made a „proposal‟ as to how the issue of amnesty and accountability could 
be handled through an investigative “truth commission”.
169
 Interestingly, this very early 
proposal, published months even before the Postamble in the Interim Constitution, included 
some of the key „building blocks‟ of the eventual amnesty for truth arrangement in the TRC. 
While the ANC had made public statements insisting that a “general amnesty” would not be 
used to cover up the truth.
170
 This „proposal‟ by the LHR seems to be the earliest document of 
this kind setting out specific ways in which the issue of accountability could be dealt with 
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1) The apartheid government was not a legitimate government and therefore did not have 
a mandate from the victims and those who have suffered; 
2) General amnesty “without disclosure” would perpetuate a culture of abuse and 
intolerance; 
3) Unilateral and illegitimate granting of amnesty could result in revenge attacks and 
thus a further breakdown of law and order; 
4) To grant amnesty is to absolve someone from their crimes and implies forgiveness – a 
right which only the victims themselves retain; 
5) There is a need to understand the “anti-human rights ethos” that has pervaded South 
African life and culture and to place this within the context of the thousands of 
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victims of human rights violations. A general amnesty couched in secrecy would 
prevent this and would amount to an “insensitivity” towards this suffering and does 
not give proper regard to the importance of developing a human rights culture in 
South Africa; 
6) A general amnesty surrounded by secrecy will further discredit the „rule of law‟ and 
the administration of justice in South Africa – this would not be conducive to 
attaining a “just and democratic society”. 
 
Significantly, unlike the Argentine human rights organisations, the LHR did not reject 
outright the possibility of amnesty as a matter of principle. Instead they were prepared to go 
along with a compromise if it accommodated victim-oriented perspectives and promoted the 
interests of reconciliation and peace. However, the LHR was not prepared to accept a 
compromise at any cost; an amnesty was acceptable only so long as it served the purpose of 
encouraging truth recovery about the past and would not be a general, self-amnesty.  
 
In its position paper, the LHR in effect offered key proposals how the government should 
deal with human rights abuses and the granting of amnesty.
172
 The LHR suggested that a new 
democratic government establish an investigative body such as the Chilean Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights abuses. The task of the commission 
would be to investigate and establish as complete a picture as possible of human rights 
violations as well as to grant amnesty to perpetrators on an individual basis and with full-
disclosure as a pre-requisite for amnesty.
173
 In order to do this the Commission should have 
wide powers allowing it to subpoena people and to access official documents as well as to 
gain “search and seizure” access to government and private premises. It should also be 
independent from the state. Proceedings should all take place in public except in rare 
exceptions and on completion it should publish a comprehensive report on its work which 




For our purposes the crucial issue remained that of how to deal with those responsible for 
human rights violations. In this regard, the LHR position paper stated:  
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Provided there has been full disclosure to the satisfaction of the Commission, those implicated in 
serious human rights abuses may then apply for indemnity on an individual basis. The victims 
and families of such abuses shall be notified of such an application and shall have the right to 
submit evidence in rebuttal. A quasi-judicial body appointed by Parliament shall consider 
applications and shall be guided by the following criteria: 1) the nature and seriousness of the 
offence; 2) the interests of reconciliation; 3) the interests of the victim; 4) the promotion of a 




This did not exclude the option of criminal prosecutions. As the LHR saw it the quasi-judicial 
body, having considered all the relevant criteria, could refuse the application for indemnity 
and refer the matter to the Attorney-General with the implication that investigations and 
prosecutions would follow. The LHR position paper considered this proposal to be a “healthy 
balance between the interests of justice and those of reconciliation” and a compromise that 




LHR also held that a new democratic government should not consider itself bound by the 
Further Indemnity Act and that the LHR did “not feel that [the Further Indemnity Act] should 
in any way impact on the process of accounting.”
177
 Its response to the prospect of amnesty 
being dealt with in the same secretive manner as the Further Indemnity Act was that “from a 
principled point of view as well as from a practical point of view [it] would be disastrous for 
our fledgling democracy.”
178
 Kollapen went on to say that the LHR “must resist [the Further 
Indemnity Act] and all those who are committed to justice, truth and democracy must join us 
in resisting it.”
179
   
 
This articulation of an investigative truth commission, to which applicants for amnesty would 
make full-disclosure represents one of the earliest articulations, if not the earliest articulation, 
of the notion of amnesty linked with full-disclosure in a truth commission.  The LHR‟s 
conception of the truth commission in its proposal was of a commission as an 
“accountability” mechanism. However, the LHR‟s proposal also included considerations 
from the perspective of the victims (according to reasons 1 and 4 given above for why a 
general amnesty would not be acceptable).  Significantly, discussion over a possible 
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investigative truth commission which included a mandate for amnesty conditional on full-
disclosure was thus well under way within the LHR even before the Postamble was 
published.  
 
At the same time, Boraine‟s own substantive developments for a possible truth commission 
and for setting up the organisation Justice in Transition had begun. It is relevant that around 
this time, Alex Boraine, a prominent political and human rights figure and at the time 
Executive Director of Idasa, had begun to form ideas around transitional justice options for 
South Africa. As director of Idasa Alex Boraine had played a major role in facilitating the 
general transitional process since the late 1980s but he had not been involved in the formal 
constitutional negotiations at CODESA I and II or in the political process around the Further 
Indemnity Act and leading to the amnesty provision in the Postamble of the Interim 
Constitution. Instead he had become involved in discussions and initiatives concerned with 
issues of transitional justice. In late 1992, Boraine and a group of other civil society figures 
participated in a study tour of Eastern Europe investigating the processes and mechanisms 
used in post-Communist societies in dealing with their pasts following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.
180
 Significantly this did not particularly involve the issues of amnesty or prosecution 
but did include an investigation of the opening of the STASI archives of the former East 
Germany. Subsequently Aryeh Neier, at the time director of Human Rights Watch, made 
Boraine aware of the analogous Latin American “truth commissions”, especially those of 
Argentine and Chile, which had previously remained relatively unknown in the South African 
context.
181
 By the end of 1993 he had established contact with the international transitional 
justice network facilitated by the New York-based Justice in Times of Transition and 
prepared the ground for launching a local NGO Justice in Transition with the sole purpose of 
coordinating a response for “dealing with the past” by promoting the idea of a truth 
commission. 
 
At this juncture the Black Sash also expressed the need for those responsible and for society 
as a whole to openly acknowledge the truth about apartheid and the suffering it caused as a 
precursor to reconciliation in South Africa but also that “the need for justice requires the 
prosecution of human rights violators.”
182
 While this statement represents a principled human 
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rights response to the issue of prosecution, there is little else to suggest that this was an issue 
that the Black Sash had considered seriously enough to form part of their agenda and pursue 
to any great extent. Certainly, the issue was not prioritised to the extent that it became a focus 
of their work in the same way as issues of land, housing, health, economic and education 
rights etc. did. 
 
Among the human rights community there was consensus that 1) the importance of 
recovering and exposing the truth was paramount and therefore an effective amnesty that 
covered up the truth about the past was unacceptable and 2) that an „illegitimate‟ government 
including those guilty of human rights violations did not have the right to grant 
amnesty/forgiveness to itself. Aside from this there was not much consensus on more specific 
aspects of the problem of amnesty versus prosecutions for apartheid-era human rights 
atrocities. Kollapen at the time observed this too in his article,  
 
There is consensus that a general amnesty is not only unacceptable but would be insensitive 
and counter productive. There is however, no common position as to how we should in 
practical terms deal with accountability and what mechanisms should be put in place to 




Within the human rights community, it was primarily the Black Sash, LHR and LRC that 
responded to the issue of a prospective „general amnesty‟ posed by the Further Indemnity 
Act. Instead at this critical juncture in the SA transition the human rights community 
generally, with the exception of Boraine, extended and strengthened their projects that dealt 
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It is evident that while the issue of investigations and prosecutions of past human rights 
violations were on the radars of some human rights organisations and activists at this initial 
stage in the „transition‟, the South African human rights community generally perceived its 
role as being largely in the sphere of socio-economic rights and post-conflict reconciliation 
and transformation. The focus of these organisations at the time, including Boraine‟s own 
initiative around a transitional justice-focused NGO, was significantly not the issue of 
amnesty and prosecutions It is remarkable how much this focus contrasts with that of the 
human rights movements in Argentine in their struggle against impunity for human rights 
abuses such as murder, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention and torture. Arguably, 
unlike South Africa, human rights atrocities in Argentine arguably took the form of direct 
human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, detention without trial, torture and 
murder.
185
  In the case of South Africa, the context was different in that the entire socio-
economic structure of society was based on apartheid – a system that was itself deemed a 
crime against humanity. Thus while similar direct human rights abuses against individual 
activists and dissidents did take place – detentions without trial, torture, deaths in detention, 
“third force” hit squads etc – to a much greater extent human rights violations were structural 
and systemic in nature. So whereas in Argentine, the intense repression was focused on a 
small percentage of the population, in apartheid South Africa virtually every non-white 
citizen was a victim of institutionalised racism and deprived of political, economic and social 
rights on a daily and ongoing basis.
 186
 It is therefore perhaps reasonable that the SA human 
rights community was focused on the socio-economic legacies of apartheid which were much 
more pervasive than other more direct human rights violations.  
 
Importantly, it must also be remembered that the early 1990s was a time of extreme and 
intense political violence in South Africa. This violence was not necessarily secret and covert 
as in Argentine but took the form of killings in a civil war type of scenario. It is therefore also 
conceivable that with such high levels of killings and political violence, reported in the 
media, the priority of the human rights community at this stage reasonably also lied with 
finding a solution to stop the killings as opposed to gathering evidence to prosecute the 
authors of the violence.  
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Although human rights organisations publicly condemned the Further Indemnity insofar as 
they believed that it represented the prospect of a „general amnesty‟ for human rights 
violations, their responses were relatively piecemeal. Unlike in Argentine, the SA human 
rights community did not express a single and coherent agenda regarding the need for truth 
and prosecution but rather responded separately mainly in news articles and as press 
statements and position papers. . Comparable to the case in Argentine, this rejection did not 
take the form of substantial lobbying or campaigning around the issue. 
 
Furthermore, there is no indication of a human rights movement comparable to the movement 
in Argentine. In the early stage of the transition, the Argentine human rights movement 
occupied centre stage in terms of its demands for truth and justice and at a time when the 
military was significantly weakened by their defeat in the Falklands war. However, by 
comparison the central development in South Africa regarding the transition was not the 
uprising of a human rights movement with similar demands, nor the defeat of the SADF, but 
rather involved mass demonstrations around the anti-apartheid struggle which by this stage 
had the ANC at its centre. So, while in South Africa there were major and significant social 
and political movements as part of the general anti-apartheid “struggle”, the human rights 
community was involved in a relatively minor and secondary capacity. Certainly the human 
rights community was not at the core of these movements in South Africa. The human rights 
community‟s concerns generally reflected those of the broader anti-apartheid struggle, and in 
so far as it had distinctive human rights concerns around the issues of amnesty and 
prosecutions, it was hardly in a position to impose these on the agendas of the broader anti-
apartheid social and political movements. Even had the human rights community presented 
more of a unified/coordinated response it is unlikely that they would have had a similar effect 















CHAPTER 4: THE COM ING TOGETHER OF TWO AGENDAS 
 
4.1 The Postamble  
 
The inner history of just how the issue of amnesty arose for the various actors during the 
constitutional negotiations is complex and highly contested but outside the scope of this 
thesis. For our purposes, what is relevant is the extent to which the issue became a public 
issue to which the human rights community could respond.
187
 Only a day or two before the 
Postamble was signed, reports in the media were limited to speculation on the possibility of 
an amnesty clause being included in the Interim Constitution as the outcome of the political 
negotiations.
188
  The LHR was quoted on 6 December 1993 (before the publication of the 
Postamble which was only later on in the evening) as saying that it was unacceptable that a 
general amnesty for politically motivated offences was even being discussed and questioned 
“how the Government could be considering extending the cut-off date for indemnity.”
189
 This 
statement by the LHR is indicative of the secrecy surrounding political discussions for 
amnesty which resulted in mixed messages being sent to the public regarding the prospective 
amnesty. 
 
In the event, negotiators came to an agreement on the issue of amnesty, provided for in a 
carefully worded Postamble attached at the last minute to the Interim Constitution. The 
provision for amnesty in the Postamble was deliberately worded so as to avoid a hard and fast 
commitment to a general amnesty at this stage. The Postamble simply stated that “amnesty 
shall be granted” but left it up to the future political leadership to create legislation to deal 
with the mechanisms, procedures and criteria: 
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…In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in 
respects of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall 
adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and 
before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, 
including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after 




Little about the amnesty was revealed by the negotiators at this time except for in an article 





 Following an article in the Sunday Times which implied that the amnesty 
in the Postamble was a general amnesty, Asmal published an article entitled „Amnesty is not 
amnesia‟ in which he assured members of the public that the amnesty would not be general 
amnesty.
 192
 Asmal stated his own principled objections to a blanket amnesty on the grounds 
that such an amnesty “would have prevented any inquests or commissions of inquiry into the 
past” and would have been “disastrous”. In the article Asmal emphasised that the “council 
decision gives the new parliament the right to work out the mechanisms, criteria and 
procedures for amnesty.” Asmal‟s article suggests that what the ANC had in mind at this 
stage was not a truth commission in the form of the eventual TRC process, but rather an 
amnesty process along the lines of the Amnesty Committee within the eventual TRC.  
 
The Postamble‟s provision for amnesty was reported on in newspapers around the country in 
the days and weeks following its publication, often times incorrectly reporting that the 
amnesty was a general amnesty.
193
 For example, on 7 December 1993, the day after the 
Postamble was signed, The Argus reported that an agreement had been signed by negotiators 
empowering the new parliament to grant a “general amnesty”.
194
 However, the National 
Unity and Reconciliation clause was extensively quoted in the article indicating that members 
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of the human rights community, whether directly, or through news reports, did have access to 
the actual text of the Postamble.  
 
Graeme Simpson, then executive director of CSVR, wrote an article in the Business Day in 
which he responded to a report in the Sunday Times that the government intended to use a 
general amnesty.
 
In his article, Simpson argued that a “blanket amnesty posed a threat to 
reconciliation”:  
 
These blanket amnesties in respect of human rights abuses by the stated during the apartheid 
era, without any parallel obligation to disclose the nature of the “crimes” perpetrated, have 
grave implications for the prospects of national reconciliation. In particular, for the victims of 
these abuses of power, on whichever side of the political spectrum they may reside, the 





Simpson‟s response indicated a victim-centred approach to the matter of amnesty which 
prioritised the imperative of truth and also of national reconciliation.  
 
A thorough scan of news publications after the 6 December 1993 indicate that responses from 
the human rights community, if any, did not feature to any great extent in the media. There is 
little evidence to suggest that the publication of the provision for amnesty in the Postamble 
occasioned strong reactions from the human rights community. In fact, a few days after the 
publication of the Postamble, LHR featured in the media to some extent in connection not to 
the Postamble and the issue of amnesty but rather in connection to its support for a Bill of 
Rights, its human rights education and a new joint campaign with LRC, HRC and other 




Significantly, even after the publication of the Postamble, the human rights community 
continued to be preoccupied with socio-economic issues. LRC‟s annual report for the year 
ending on 31 March 1994 made no special mention of the issue of amnesty, the more 
surprising considering that the amnesty provision had been included in the Postamble of the 
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Interim Constitution in December 1993. Likewise Geoff Budlender gave an address as 
National Director at the Annual General Meeting of the LRC in March 1994 in which he 
signalled important areas of focus for the LRC in the future: 1) Giving life to the Bill of 
Rights and making sure that it did not entrench inequalities but addressed the inequalities of 
apartheid; 2) access to land, housing and development as well as claims to land restitution, in 
all of which civil society could play a critical role; 3) building more advice offices 4) 
advocacy outside the courts for a more open process in devising the Bill of Rights and the 
permanent constitution; 5) change in strategy for working with government.
197
 Again this list 
of human rights priorities made no mention of the Postamble‟s provision of amnesty as an 
issue of concern.  
 
Boraine made his own response to the publication of the Postamble clear in a recent 
interview:  “As soon as I saw the Postamble and that there would be an amnesty I started 
thinking of ways we were going to get around a general amnesty. What are the victims going 
to get?”
198
 Thus, Boraine‟s immediate response was not to reject the amnesty but rather 
amounted to an effort to temper it by responding to the needs of the victims.  
 
For our purposes, it is significant that the publication of the amnesty provision in the 
Postamble did not at the time occasion any strong public reactions from within the SA human 
rights community. Certainly, this stands in stark contrast to the public mobilisation of the 
Argentine human rights movement in 1982 protesting the military junta‟s self-amnesty. There 
are two possible reasons for this. The one is that the human rights community did not pay any 
particular attention to the amnesty provision in the Postamble. An alternative explanation 
would depend on how the human rights community interpreted the Postamble. In terms of the 
viewpoints of the human rights community articulated in various articles and statements 
during 1992-1993 as discussed in Chapter Three, there had been little indication of a 
principled rejection of amnesty as such. The human rights community‟s main concerns had 
been that 1) the amnesty should not be a self-amnesty issued by the National Party 
government and 2) that the amnesty should not be a general amnesty. The negotiated amnesty 
included in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution was arguably in line with 1) in so far as 
it did not amount to a unilateral self-amnesty issued by the NP government. As for 2), the 
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objection to a general amnesty, the Postamble did provide for amnesty but left open its 
“mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals” which would have to be debated 
and decided in parliament. It was therefore conceivable that the amnesty need not be a 
general amnesty or along the lines of the controversial Further Indemnity Act.  It was also 
conceivable that guidelines and processes could be created so as to make the amnesty more 
acceptable from a human rights perspective. The text of the Postamble, as well as Asmal‟s 
article in the Sunday Times would presumably have alerted the human rights community to 
this possibility from early on. This may explain the lack of response from the human rights 
community to the Postamble at the time. In particular it might be that the LHR‟s relative 
„silence‟ at the time that the Postamble was published might have been because the text of the 
Postamble actually implied that there would, in due course, be a process around amnesty and 
that this could be made compatible with some of their own proposals for an “acceptable” 
amnesty process. 
 
The retrospective accounts of Albie Sachs and Kader Asmal, who were both involved in the 
ANC‟s Constitutional Committee during the negotiations, show that they did have major 
objections to a general amnesty.
199
 Their objections concerned the lack of any sense of 
accountability as well as the implications that amnesty would have for truth – blanket 
amnesty would mean there would be “no knowledge of what really happened.”  Of his own 
response to the NP‟s alleged last-minute demand for a general amnesty, Sachs writes: 
 
I felt a blanket amnesty would be completely wrong. There would be no sense of 
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The roles of Asmal and Sachs in the formulation of the amnesty are particularly complex. On 
the one hand both Sachs and Asmal were involved in the political negotiations as the ANC‟s 
representatives of the CODESA II Constitutional Committee which had the responsibility of 
drafting the Postamble of the Interim Constitution including the provision for amnesty
201
 On 
the other hand, both Asmal and Sachs also had significant „human rights‟ profiles.
202
 For this 
reason, we pay particular attention to their role and impact on the formulation of the amnesty 
provision in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution, as well as the (subsequent) 
development of the amnesty-for-truth arrangement linked to the TRC. 
 
4.2 Fusing the amnesty issue with a victim-centred truth and reconciliation process 
 
This thesis argues that the complex set of developments from late 1993 which resulted in the 
TRC Bill by the end of 1994 may best be understood by making a distinction between two 
different kinds of processes which came together in the conception of the eventual TRC.  
 
One set of developments concerned the unresolved issues raised by the amnesty provision in 
the Postamble. This process was driven by political figures associated with the constitutional 
negotiations and the new Government of National Unity including Kader Asmal, Albie Sachs 
and the new Minister of Justice Dullah Omar. They were concerned with developing a 
framework for the “mechanisms, criteria and procedures” through which the amnesty 
entrenched in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution could be implemented in ways that 
would avoid the impunity and amnesia of a general amnesty. This took the form of a 
perpetrator-focused individual and conditional “amnesty for truth” compromise.  
 
The other set of developments related to the articulation and promotion of the notion of a 
victim-centred “truth and reconciliation” process. In effect this was a civil society–based 
initiative involving key members of the human rights community such as Alex Boraine and 
Justice in Transition. The remainder of this chapter will show that the notion of a victim-
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centred truth and reconciliation commission was largely developed from the side of Boraine 
who, as a member of the human rights community, was not primarily concerned with 
ensuring the accountability (or amnesty) of the perpetrators of past human rights violations.      
 
In the course of 1994 these two „separate‟ but parallel agendas came to be linked in a 
particular way that proved to be definitive for the nature and structure of the eventual TRC 
process. In effect the civil society-based notion of a victim-centred truth commission 
proposed by human rights figures like Boraine was conjoined with the truth-for-amnesty 
compromise supported by key political figures such as Asmal and Sachs. In this way the TRC 
as a victim-oriented truth process with a mandate for amnesty for perpetrators of past human 
rights violations came about. We will first deal with the origins of the civil society and 
human rights-based proposals for a victim-centred “truth and reconciliation” process, and 
then with the complex interactions which resulted in this initiative being conjoined with the 
“truth-for amnesty” compromise. 
 
4.2.1 The Civil Society-based Initiative for “Dealing with the Past” 
 
Subsequent to the publication of the Postamble of the Interim Constitution at the end of 1993 
there was little further official action or immediate public responses regarding the issue of 
amnesty. Instead, politicians and indeed most of the country were focused on the impending 
democratic elections scheduled for April 1994. Furthermore, unlike in the Argentine case in 
1983, the issue of “dealing with the past” was not on the agenda of the 1994 elections. 
Instead, the ANC‟s electoral campaign was centred on its manifesto of “a better life for all” 
emphasising job creation, new housing schemes and a new education system, general social-
economic upliftment etc. Apartheid „human rights violations‟ were not a key focus of the 
ANC‟s electoral campaign or that of any other political party; rather the ANC focused on 
„forward-looking‟ strategies to correct the legacy of structural and systemic injustices left in 
the wake of apartheid through a comprehensive reconstruction and development (RDP) 
policy.
203
 It did not prioritise any objectives regarding matters of truth and justice, 
responsibility and accountability for apartheid itself – a crime against humanity – or for 
human rights atrocities committed during the apartheid era.   
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This was quite different to Alfonsin‟s campaign in the lead-up to the civilian elections in 
Argentine in 1983 which focused very specifically on the issue of human rights in relation to 
the abuses of the military junta and explicitly promised to seek “truth and justice” and guard 
against possible impunity for the perpetrators of past human rights violations. This human 
rights platform was adopted by Alfonsin‟s Reform Party in response to the popular demands 
of the human rights movement which had, prior to the elections, mobilised public protests of 
up to 70 000 people around the issues of truth and retributive justice for human rights 
violations. In the case of Argentine, the human rights movement set the agenda to which 
politicians then had to respond.  
 
However, during the lead-up to the elections a significant initiative was beginning to develop 
around the question of “dealing with the past” in South Africa. Significantly this initiative 
developed from within civil society and outside the terrain of the constitutional negotiations 
or that of the founding democratic elections. Two months after the publication of the Interim 
Constitution in February 1994, Alex Boraine, who was at the time executive director of Idasa, 
took the initiative to set up a national workshop on the topic of “dealing with the past.” As 
discussed earlier, by the end of 1993 Boraine had begun to prepare the ground for launching 
the NGO Justice in Transition with the sole purpose of coordinating a response for “dealing 
with the past” by promoting the idea of a truth commission. At the time, Boraine wrote:  
 
This small organisation will focus on how South African can come to terms with its past. In 
particular the emphasis will be on reconciliation through facing up to and dealing with the 
violations of human rights during the apartheid era. In the second place, an attempt will be 
made to address the gap between myth and reality in the perception of the history of the 




At the “Dealing with the Past” conference in February 1994, which still took place under the 
auspices of Idasa, Boraine argued for setting up a truth commission supported by civil society 
and the human rights community.
205
 In an article published in Idasa‟s Democracy in Action, 
he argued that a truth commission would serve as a mechanism for the voices of the victims 
to be heard: “those who say we shouldn‟t rake up the past should tell that to the victims of 
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apartheid. We have to listen to those who have suffered.”
206
 From this article, written by 
Boraine immediately after the conference, it is not entirely clear where the issue of amnesty 
would come into the compass of a truth commission, if at all. Instead, it would appear that 
Boraine‟s own understanding of a truth commission at this stage was in terms of a victim-
centred process of truth telling and an official acknowledgement of that truth as a means to 
„healing‟ for the victims. Immediately following this workshop, Boraine left Idasa to found 
Justice in Transition as an independent NGO.  
  
The published proceedings of the workshop Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation 
in South Africa (1994) provide a valuable record of the approach and responses of selected 
members of the SA human rights community at this transitional moment. The workshop was 
the most high profile civil society-based initiative to articulate and promote the notion of 
dealing with the past as a response to the needs of the victims of apartheid. Most of the 
presentations made were by international scholars and practitioners of transitional justice. In 
Boraine‟s words this “preparatory conference focused on the experiences of Eastern Europe 
and Latin America in order to assist South Africans towards a better appreciation of the 
complexity and extent of the problem and to narrow the options which might be open to 
us.”
207
 But a good part of the conference was set aside to hear the views of South African 
participants. In this regard it is significant that the focus of the workshop was not on the issue 
of amnesty. While the issue of amnesty did emerge in the debates and discussion the 
overarching imperative for the workshop was not framed in terms of a response to the issue 
of amnesty. Bearing in mind that the workshop took place within two months of the 
publication of the Interim Constitution and the Postamble including the provision for 
amnesty, we might well have expected that this would figure prominently in the workshop 
especially on the part of members of the SA human rights community. But as the record of 
the workshop proceedings make clear the issue of amnesty as such did not emerge as a 
central issue in these presentations and discussions.
208
 The one exception was a presentation 
by the legal scholar Lourens du Plessis which provided a legal analysis of the amnesty 
provision in the Interim Constitution. Du Plessis however was more concerned with how the 
amnesty in the Postamble could affect the existing Indemnity and Further Indemnity Acts 
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rather than with its nature and significance from a principled human rights perspective.
209
 Du 
Plessis did provide a succinct and striking summary of what he took to be the thrust of the 
Postamble‟s framing of the amnesty provision: “For the sake of reconciliation we must 
forgive, but for the sake of reconstruction we dare not forget.”
210
   This suggests that while 
the amnesty provision ruled out criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of past human rights 
violations it could still be made compatible with a truth and reconciliation process. The 
contributions of most of the South African participants were similarly concerned not with a 
perpetrator-focused need for retributive justice but with developing a victim-oriented 
perspective for “dealing with the past”: acknowledging the pain and suffering of victims of 
apartheid and in this way to bring some measure of “healing” to the victims.
211
 As such this 
first workshop functioned as a significant expression of a civil-society based articulation and 
promotion of a truth commission as a victim-centred process. 
 
Some South African participants did comment on the issue of amnesty although this was 
either done in passing or else in reference to the imperative of “reconciliation”. Mary Burton 
from the Black Sash for example stated: 
 
We need to dismantle the security apparatus and deal with whatever files may be left … 
though I have grave doubts about disqualification or lustration without some other process. I 
do not think a commission report can lead to that. We need to prosecute the guilty. We need 
to stop the hit squads and assassinations that still continue. We need mechanisms to find those 




Burton‟s statement represented the kind of principled human rights rejection of amnesty and 
a personal commitment to criminal prosecution which has not been found so far from any 
other in the human rights community. Burton‟s statement also implied a rejection of the 
amnesty provision in the Postamble. Burton did not however elaborate on the implications of 
the Postamble for her own view regarding the need to prosecute the guilty. Neither did she 
attempt to make a case for the prosecution of perpetrators. As a result, the assertion cannot be 
said to be indicative of a serious agenda on behalf of Burton or Black Sash regarding the 
issue of prosecutions.  
                                                          
209
 Du Plessis, Lourens. 1994. Amnesty and Transition in South Africa. Dealing with the Past, pp. 107-116 
210
 Ibid., p. 109  
211
 A number of South African participants also focused on the need for development and a major improvement 
on service delivery for black people 
212
















For various reasons Sachs‟s few comments on the amnesty issue in the course of his 
contribution to this conference deserves special attention. Unlike the other SA participants he 
had been directly involved in the drafting of the eventual amnesty provision in the Postamble. 
While a leading ANC figure he had also established a strong human rights profile; as we 
discussed earlier in this chapter, he later indicated that he had had principled objections to the 
prospect of a general amnesty when this was put to the Constitutional Committee of 
CODESA II. Sachs also contributed to the compromise formulation in the Postamble. At the 
conference Sachs said: 
 
There will be amnesty. We are constitutionally committed to an amnesty. One can lament and 
criticise and argue about its terms. But the amnesty is balanced out with the concept of 
reconciliation and reconstruction. It is not a reconciliation to bury and forget the past, which 





Sachs‟s formulations indicate his acceptance of the amnesty provision as a fixed and 
legitimate outcome of the Constitutional negotiations. Interestingly, while Sachs‟s accounts 
did have strong overtones of a theological approach oriented around notions of 
“reconciliation” and “healing”, there is no indication in his account of the “truth for amnesty” 
approach that might make the amnesty provision more acceptable from a human rights 
perspective. Instead Sachs emphasised forwarded-looking measures that would contribute to 
healing: “it will be street lights, education, the health system, the sense of dignity, 
participation and true equality. That will be the greatest healer. We must focus on the healing 
side and let the rascals be swept away by history to be lashed by their own consciences.”
214
 
Taken literally, Sachs is suggesting that not only would there be no option for criminal 
prosecutions for perpetrators, but that their consequent impunity would have to be accepted. 
Again, there is no evidence of an attempt by Sachs to temper the amnesty with the objective 
of truth and disclosure. 
  
Asmal‟s account of the amnesty issue in the conference was also revealing. Referring to the 
NP government‟s demands for a “general amnesty” during the final stages of the 
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constitutional negotiations, Asmal said that it was for this reason that “ANC negotiators 
offered a clause in the constitution concerning reconciliation” (own emphasis).
215
 This was a 
somewhat disingenuous reference to the amnesty provision in the Postamble of the Interim 
Constitution. Asmal claimed that South Africa was unique in the African context in entering 
a transition “without a general amnesty law” and stressed the significance of the ANC‟s 
resistance of the NP government‟s attempts to implement “blanket self-amnesties”.
216
 
However, despite emphasising the importance of truth-telling he significantly gave no 
indication of the negotiated amnesty as a prospective “truth-for-amnesty” compromise.  
Arguably, like Sachs, Asmal‟s approach to the issue of amnesty as a means to „reconciliation‟ 
reflected a shift from the perpetrator-focused concerns of the CODESA negotiations to the 
victim-oriented perspective of the “Dealing with the Past” conference.  Although, given their 
involvement in the political process and negotiations, as well as their involvement in the 
amnesty compromise itself, their responses cannot be taken at face value and may rather 
represent a strategic interpretation. 
 
4.2.2 The intersection of the amnesty provision and the initiative for a victim-oriented truth 
process 
 
The “Dealing with the Past” conference in February 1994 was followed by another 
conference on The Healing of a Nation?, now officially under the auspices of Justice in 
Transition, in July 1994. During the intervening few months the founding democratic 
elections took place on 27 April 1994 and Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as President of 
the new Government of National Unity on 10 May 1994. These workshops, it will be argued, 
also marked the intersection of the new government‟s political agenda to give effect to the 
provision for amnesty in the Postamble and a civil-society based initiative, led by Alex 
Boraine, for a victim-oriented truth and reconciliation process. More generally, it will be 
argued that certain interactions in the interim between the two workshops led to the linking of 
two „separate‟ but parallel agendas that issued in the eventual TRC process. These events 
involved a series of complex interactions between Sachs, Asmal and also the new Minister of 
Justice Dullah Omar on the one hand, and Alex Boraine and other members of the human 
rights community on the other hand. Through these interactions, it will be argued, the 
political “truth for amnesty” compromise became linked to the civil society-based initiative 
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for a victim-centred truth commission. The fusion of these different „agendas‟, which had 
their respective origins in the negotiated constitutional settlement at CODESA and in the 
concerns of Boraine and other in the human rights community and civil society, account for 
key structural features of the eventual “dual” TRC process. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission  encompassed both a victim-centred process involving truth-telling and 
testimony as well as reparations for victims (the Human Rights Violations Committee and the 
Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee) and also a perpetrator focused process with the 
mandate of implementing the amnesty in the Postamble (the Amnesty Committee). That the 
TRC always battled to reconcile the different imperatives, discourses and practices involved 
in the amnesty process with those driving the victim hearings may be traced back to these 
different genealogies. 
 
According to Boraine, Asmal and Sachs approached him soon after the “Dealing with the 
Past” conference to draw up a proposal regarding a possible truth commission to be 
forwarded to Mandela.
217
 As discussed in Chapter Three Asmal and Sachs had been centrally 
involved in the CODESA Constitutional Committee‟s “crisis” which resulted in the last 
minute amnesty compromise included in the Postamble. Both had also participated in 
Boraine‟s February conference and were aware of the civil society initiative around the idea 
of a victim-oriented truth commission. It seems plausible that the reason they approached him 
was to suggest that this victim-oriented initiative could be linked to a “truth-for-amnesty” 
compromise that might make the amnesty provision entrenched in the Interim Constitution 
more politically acceptable. Such a suggestion would not have been alien to Boraine in the 
context of his own concern for the needs of victims. The letter Boraine sent to Mandela with 
a proposal for a truth commission based on the proceedings of the February conference was 
notably silent on the issue of amnesty.  In the main text of his letter Boraine emphasised the 
value and importance of uncovering the truth in order to give effect to reconciliation while 
only mentioning amnesty in passing and cautioning that it should not be confused with 
amnesia.
218
 However, a more specific proposal with the motivation, objectives and terms of 
reference of a truth commission was attached to the letter.
219
 Under the heading „Terms of 
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Reference‟ it did address the issue of amnesty in formulations directly based on those of the 
Postamble: 
 
Where the Interim Constitution provides for amnesty to be granted “for acts, omissions and 
offences associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the 
past” it should be ensured that such amnesty is fully compatible with the requirements of 
public accountability. It should be the responsibility of this Commission to make 
recommendations providing for the “mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, 
if any, through which amnesty shall be dealt with” as envisaged by the Interim Constitution, 




Significantly this included the “mechanisms, criteria and procedures” for the granting of 
amnesty, which had been left open in the Postamble, as part of the objectives and functions of 
the proposed truth commission. Though there is no specific mention of the “amnesty-for-
truth” compromise, or of full disclosure as a condition for individual amnesty, the reference 
to “the requirements of public accountability” is consonant with Sachs‟s later retrospective 
account of their principled objections to blanket amnesty. The fusion of the two initiatives in 
these formulations had a dual significance: on the one hand Boraine‟s taking on board of 
amnesty as one of the functions of his proposed commission meant that the victim-oriented 
truth and reconciliation process had now been extended to become a mechanism for dealing 
with the perpetrators as well; on the other hand, the “truth-for-amnesty” compromise arising 
from the negotiated settlement of the Interim Constitution had in effect been endorsed from a 
key member representing a civil society and human rights perspective at this time. 
 
Boraine‟s letter to Mandela and the proposal for a truth commission did not get any 
immediate response. There were no further developments until the end of May 1994 when 
Boraine, “anxious” to discuss the matter of a truth commission, requested a meeting with 
Omar as Minister of Justice. Boraine relates that in the meeting:  
 
[Omar] made it very clear that he was totally committed to a truth commission. He reminded 
me that the ANC NEC had made that decision in 1993 and he was anxious that amnesty, 
which was allowed for in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution, should not be the 
dominant theme in dealing with the past but that we should be concerned always with victims, 
with reparation and with truth. I was delighted to hear his own response because it coincided 

















very much with my own views, and from that day on we had a quite remarkable partnership 





It was following this meeting that Boraine and a small group including Dullah Omar and 
Johnny de Lange began to discuss preliminary drafts for a possible TRC. According to 
Boraine, these discussions were very informal and most of them were held either at his own 
or at Omar‟s home. The group debated issues in relation to a possible truth commission and 




Omar, Asmal and Sachs had definite political incentives for having the conceptualisation of 
the TRC prepared outside the official structures of the Government of National Unity at this 
stage. Taking into account the already fragile relationship between the ANC and the NP, the 
two main parties in the transitional Government of National Unity, the ANC strategically 
opted to instigate the drafting of the TRC legislation in its early stages outside of official 
GNU structure and rather to proceed in consultation with selected agents of civil society.
223
 
In an interview Medard Rwelamira, who was a key advisor to Omar at the time and closely 
involved in the drafting processes for the TRC legislation, confirmed that Omar “wanted to 




Omar‟s strategy may be understood in the context of the ambiguous nature of the amnesty 
compromise as formulated in the Postamble. As has already been discussed, according to 
Sachs‟s account the compromise formulations in the Postamble were, at least on the part of 
the ANC representatives in the Constitutional Committee, informed by the notion of an 
“amnesty-for-truth” conception. However, as Sachs also admitted, this may not have been 
understood by the negotiators on the side of the NP.
225
  If that had been the case, then taking 
the drafting of the proposed conditional “amnesty for truth” legislation to the GNU structures 
might have alerted the NP members of the cabinet to the different interpretation of the 
amnesty provision in the Postamble that was under way. Keeping the initial drafting process 
away from the GNU structures and doing it along with selected civil society figures may have 
served to prevent the "amnesty-for-truth" interpretation being challenged from the outset. But 
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doing it in this way also had the consequence that it closely involved these civil society and 
human rights figures in the drafting of the amnesty legislation and provisions (as well as of 
the rest of the TRC structures).  
 
It is interesting that Omar/Sachs/Asmal did not approach members from other human rights 
organisations such as the LHR or the LRC at this stage. In fact, given that the LHR had 
already made a start on how the arrangement of full-disclosure in exchange for amnesty could 
work
226
 it might have been appropriate for the Minister of Justice to approach the LHR for 
assistance with drawing up the legislation for amnesty. However, given the LHR‟s more 
legalist orientation and perpetrator focus, this might well have resulted in an initial draft 
proposal with a primary focus on the issue of amnesty itself, which was what Omar was eager 
to avoid at this stage. Instead, it was Alex Boraine, who had coordinated various civil society 
meetings and conferences in order to promote and encourage debate around a victim-oriented 
truth process, who emerged as the key interlocutor facilitating the fusion of the official 
agenda and the civil society-based initiative.  
 
Previously Boraine‟s own agenda regarding a “truth commission” had been focused on 
„victims‟, „reparations‟ and „truth‟, and not on the issue of amnesty. For his part Omar, as the 
new ANC Minister of Justice, had the unenviable responsibility to give effect to the amnesty 
provision in the context of the Postamble. Linking the amnesty to a truth commission and its 
associated objectives gave more validity to the Postamble‟s stated goal of promoting national 
unity and reconciliation.
227
 Arguably, it therefore suited Omar strategically to locate the 
state‟s implementation of amnesty within the notion of a truth commission that was patently 
victim oriented and supported by civil society. Certainly, Omar stressed the victim-oriented 
objectives of the truth commission which this thesis argues was more a strategic emphasis on 
Omar‟s part to maximise the ANC leadership‟s distance from the implementation of the 
amnesty provision in the Postamble than anything else. It is possible to argue that the 
decision to approach Boraine as part of getting the initial drafting of the TRC underway may 
be interpreted as part of the ANC‟s agenda to downplay the amnesty aspect and rather 
emphasise the “victim” centred imperative for a truth commission.  
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More generally, the involvement of Alex Boraine, perhaps the strongest civil society-based 
advocate of a truth commission, also represented a significant moment in the development of 
the TRC concept as not just a mechanism to dispense amnesty but also a victim-centred 
mechanism. It is arguable that it was at this juncture that the linking up of two different 
concepts occurred that came to inform the eventual dual TRC process: the one dealing with 
amnesty-for-truth, and other pertaining to a victim-centred truth commission with victim 
hearings and reparations.  
 
4.3 Second TJ Workshop on “The Healing of a Nation?”, July 1994 
 
In the time between the first transitional justice workshop and the second workshop, the new 
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar had made two important public statements regarding the 
setting up of an official truth commission. The first was a statement in parliament in which 
Omar referred to his task to prepare appropriate legislation to provide for amnesty. In 
parliament on 27 May 1994, Omar stated: 
 
I want to give an assurance to those who have fears and who may have perpetrated human 
rights violations and who want to join in reconciliation, that in respect of politically motivated 
crimes there will be no Nuremburg-type trials. There will be no vengeance or witch-hunts, 




Omar also said that at the same time there would be “no sweeping under the carpet and there 
will be no suppression of the truth. There will be no amnesty without disclosure.” Of the 
actual criteria and legislation Omar merely said that a cut-off date would be set, that there 
should be full disclosure and acknowledgement; that ordinary crimes would not be covered; 




 June 1994 Minister Omar made a public statement elaborating on his 27 May 
statement made in parliament regarding the setting up of a truth commission and a 
mechanism to deal with amnesty.
229
 The Minister stated that in “finalising” their proposals 
they were considering a number of factors for a truth commission to enable South Africans to 
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“come to terms with our past on the only moral basis possible namely that the truth be told 
and the truth be acknowledged.”
230
  The Minister stated that the terms of reference of the 
Commission would include “investigating and establishing the truth about human rights 
violations and their acknowledgement” as well as making provision for “amnesty/indemnity”. 
He said that the Commission may include a specialised structure to deal with all applications 
and recommendations and that “offences in respect of which amnesty may be applied for will 
be defined strictly within the framework of the constitutional provision on national unity and 
reconciliation.”
231
 Omar‟s announcement called for the public to submit comments and 
proposals by 30 June iterating that “participation in the process will help the nation to heal 




It was after this announcement made by Omar that a second workshop, also organised by 
Boraine but this time officially under the auspices of Justice in Transition, took place in June 
1994. Again this workshop was not specifically on the topic of amnesty; entitled “The 
Healing of a Nation?” it concerned a range of general transitional justice issues in dealing 
with the past in South Africa.   
 
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar gave the keynote address to the conference and announced 
some more specifics concerning the objectives and nature of the proposed truth 
commission.
233
  With regard to the proposed amnesty process Omar announced that one of 
three specialised committees of the proposed TRC would be the “Committee on Amnesty or 
Indemnity”.
234
 He also set out some of the parameters for the individual and conditional 
amnesty process that were envisaged: 
 
The cut-off date for offences committed is 5 December 1993 in respect of which applications 
may be made for indemnity or amnesty. In respect of indemnity, applications will have to be 
made by a date fixed by law. Political offences are defined to cover certain actions not only of 
the liberation movements, but also of state security forces and other organisations. There is 






 While the deadline for the submissions was 30 June, a number of submissions responding to this call were 
submitted after this deadline and indeed after the second June TJ conference 
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broadly speaking a return to the criteria set out in the Indemnity Act of 1990, namely the 




From this it was clear that the proposed TRC and in particular its Amnesty Committee would 
serve to provide the “mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals” through 
which amnesty would be dealt with as required in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution. 
It would not be a general amnesty but an individual and conditional process with “full 
disclosure” as a precondition for amnesty. This criterion reflected the “truth for amnesty” 
compromise left implicit by the Constitutional Committee in drafting the Postamble. 
 
In his address, Omar stressed the need for a commission that would be victim-oriented and 
which would enable victims a chance to tell their stories of human rights abuses as well as to 
claim reparation. Inter alia, this commission would also give effect to the amnesty for 
perpetrators of human rights violations as required by the Interim Constitution. With his 
address and announcements at the second conference Dullah Omar thus firmly and publicly 
linked the state-initiated concern with “amnesty-for-truth” with the civil society-based 
initiative for a victim-oriented truth and reconciliation process. There were many aspects of 
the amnesty process that were still to be decided. Omar‟s announcement did not say how the 
hearings would be conducted, whether they would be in public, who would sit on the 
Amnesty Committee or what more specific criteria and procedures would be adopted.  
 
Significantly though, the matter at the heart of the discussions at the “Healing of a Nation?” 
conference was not the issue of amnesty but rather the best way to move forward in South 
Africa while ensuring that the past would be remembered and the victims of apartheid 
acknowledged. A content analysis of the submissions by members of civil society and the 
broad human rights community is revealing. The discourse generally was one that framed 
choices about the future of the country in terms of a need for „truth‟ about the past, 
„acknowledgement‟ of the victims, „healing‟, „reconciliation‟, and reparations for victims. 
Indeed the conference as a whole was primarily concerned with the need for „reconciliation‟ 
and „healing‟ which it took to be the central task of the proposed truth commission. Typically 
participants made strong normative claims about the healing potential of truth and 
acknowledgement and conceived of the proposed TRC as a “process of moral 



















 The speakers repeatedly prioritised the need for uncovering and exposing 
the truth about apartheid-era human rights violations.
237
 Currin from the LHR postulated a 
truth commission as the source from which understanding, forgiveness, reconciliation and the 
healing of the nation could stem.
238
 Much time was spent discussing the preconditions for 
healing, forgiveness and reconciliation in the new South Africa.  
 
This sort of terminology was employed not only by members from the religious community 
or the therapeutic professions, as one might expect, but also by members of the human rights 
community. However, from a human rights perspective the notion of amnesty and “taking 
responsibility for the past and correcting injustices” do generally not go together. Rather, it is 
an axiom of principled human rights activists and lawyers that this goal needs to be achieved 
through criminal prosecutions and punishment of perpetrators of past political atrocities. This 
was certainly not the case amongst the human rights community present at these conferences. 
No one explicitly argued for „dealing with the past‟ in the sense of (retributive) justice and 
prosecution as a precondition for national healing and reconciliation. The fact that no-one 
entertained this prospect may be taken to indicate an acceptance of the negotiated CODESA 
amnesty pact as legitimate. Indeed, at the conference, there was scant reference made to 
issues of retributive justice, punishment and retribution except to denounce these as 
antithetical to the more desirable objectives of forgiveness and healing. The option of 
opening dockets, seeking evidence and prosecuting offenders was mentioned in passing by 




Some references were made to the issue of amnesty near the end of the conference by Judge 
Richard Goldstone and Professor Andre du Toit who raised problems they envisaged as 
arising out of the amnesty, such as issues of due process.
240
 Goldstone also raised the matter 
of whether or not all offences should be indemnified under the TRC and how the commission 
would deal with the question of proportionality of the offence in relation to its political 
objective.
241
 That the truth commission should take an „even-handed‟ approach to crimes 
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committed by both sides of the conflict was mentioned in a sentence by Sachs, “Now that we 
have democracy in South Africa there is no need to distinguish between an ANC bomb or a 




4.4 Last minute releases under the Further Indemnity Act, June 1994 
 
A separate but related development elicited strong reactions from the human rights 
community around the same time as the two conferences were underway. Just moments 
before Nelson Mandela‟s inauguration in May 1994, a number of prisoners were released 
under the Further Indemnity Act. Outgoing President de Klerk released sixty-three prisoners 
including a number of prisoners convicted of serious human rights atrocities; especially 
controversial was the release of those responsible for the “Trust Feed Massacre” in which 
policemen killed eleven innocent civilians on suspicion that they were pro-ANC activists. On 
30 April 1992 Brian Mitchell, the Captain responsible, had been handed 11 death sentences 
and his four accomplices 15 years imprisonment. The prosecution and sentencing to death of 
a policeman for so-called „third force‟ violence, was the first of its kind in South Africa and 
was regarded as a victory for human rights lawyers.
243
 Not surprisingly, the release of 
Mitchell and the four accomplices, just two years after being sentenced caused a great public 





The human rights community demanded an immediate freeze on indemnities granted through 
the Further Indemnity Act.
245
 The LHR, the LRC and the Black Sash were particularly 
outspoken in their condemnation of the granting of indemnity to the killers. Howard Varney 
from the LRC criticised the releases for being “anything but transparent” in that no members 
of the public, lawyers, prosecutors, police or organisations were invited to make 
representations before decisions about granting the indemnities were made. Furthermore, 
Varney criticised that the releases had been unconditional and did not require the convicted 
perpetrators of human rights violations to give assistance in ongoing investigations against 
their colleagues who remain in senior positions in the police force.
246
 Geoff Budlender from 
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LRC considered the granting of these indemnities an act that undermined the prospective 
Truth Commission, saying that it would be undermined from its inception “if while 
legislation being considered and principles for future amnesty and indemnity are being 
debated, people are being released hastily and according to criteria which we don‟t know or 
understand… If people are going to have confidence in the law and the legal system, it is 
absolutely crucial that criteria for amnesty and indemnity are publicly known and publicly 
debated.”
247
 The LHR was especially outraged as just weeks prior to the release of these 
prisoners, Currin had been approached by Minister Dullah Omar “to frame new amnesty 
provisions”. Omar had in fact set up a committee to review outstanding applications for 
indemnity and appointed LHR‟s Brian Currin the head of the committee.   
 
It is to be expected that the controversy around this process informed the human rights 
community‟s submissions on the amnesty that was to be implemented as part of the 




It is clear that the human rights community‟s overall response to the proposal for amnesty 
was not to reject it on human rights grounds but rather to discuss more general problems 
related to transitional justice such as the problem of truth and also reconciliation. By this 
stage however, the interests of the human rights community seemed to converge around a 
more coordinated agenda which had a dual concern for the victims and for the truth to come 
out.  However, this was still not to the same extent, nor on the same scale that the Argentine 
movement presented its demands for truth and justice. 
 
These differences in the South African and Argentinean human rights communities‟ 
responses to the amnesty issue reflect underlying contrasts in their social contexts and make-
up. The composition of the Argentine human rights movement compared to that of the SA 
human rights community was substantially different. While in the case of Argentine, the 
human rights movement was comprised of a significant number of victims movements, victim 
and family-based groups or organisations were completely absent from the debate around 
dealing with the past in South Africa. Certainly, at this crucial stage there was no apparent 
                                                          
247















response from, or contributions made by, groups of victims and their families to the proposal 
for an amnesty as published in the Postamble and announced by Minister Omar. In Argentine 
victims and families of the victims were a dominant component of the human rights 
movement and their agenda for truth and maximum retributive justice for human rights 
atrocities. Indeed it was the victims and the families of the victims who were the most 
outspoken about and even extreme regarding their demands for retributive justice during the 
transitional period while some of the Argentine legal human rights organisations were at 
times prepared to go along with Alfonsin‟s „limited justice‟ strategy, the victims associations 
remained steadfast in their demand for maximum retribution.      
 
In the South African case the dominant discourse around amnesty by and large conformed to 
a more general discourse of reconciliation and national unity and healing rather than a 
distinctive human rights perspective on the issue of amnesty and “dealing with the past.” The 
provision for amnesty in the Postamble did not occasion protests from the human rights 
community. Instead, apart from the initiatives of Boraine, there was relative silence around 
the issue and the responses from the human rights community were articulated only much 
later in the February and June transitional justice workshops. Even so, the human rights 
community did not articulate a response to the issue of amnesty along principled human 
rights grounds as might have been expected.  
 
At this stage of the transition some representatives of civil society were involved in the 
initiative for a truth commission to the extent that they attended the conferences and that their 
input was channelled through Boraine to the informal drafting committee responsible for the 
initial drafting of the legislation. However, the broader human rights community was not 
directly involved in this initial process. Indeed, the above account has shown that the 
involvement of the “human rights community” in the legislation of the TRC was a complex 
matter and that it involved individual members of the human rights community who did not 
come from the legal human rights community but whose roles overlapped between the 
categories of political society/civil society/human rights community.  
 
Boraine's Justice in Transition initiative had a specifically victim-centred notion of 
transitional justice while his close relationship with Omar meant that he emerged as the key 
initial contributor to the TRC legislation from the side of the human rights community. The 















process. Most HROs referred to the need for the truth be exposed and acknowledged and 
none specially argued for prosecutions or that perpetrators be held legally accountable.  This 
implied the human rights community‟s acceptance of the need for amnesty as an outcome of 
the negotiations. To the extent that Boraine was a member of the human rights community, 
one can say that the human rights community was responsible for the incorporation of the 
"victim oriented" agenda of the TRC along with the "amnesty-for-truth" compromise.  
 
Saying that, the discourse at the two conferences dealt more with the need for truth, healing 
and reconciliation than anything else. A number of the participants at the conference were 
from the academic, religious and therapeutic professions. These participants for the most part 
articulated their response to the notion of a truth commission in terms of a specifically 
victim-centred approach. So, in actual fact the agenda for a specifically victim-oriented 
process was not necessarily an initiative of the human rights community as a whole but 
emerged as a result of Boraine‟s emerging as a key figure representing the human rights 
community and civil society in the early stages of the conception of the TRC. Indeed 
Boraine‟s agenda for a victim-centred process can be characterised as a broader civil society' 
agenda which included members from the academic, religious and therapeutic professions as 
well as from the human rights community. 
 
It is perhaps surprising that the LHR did not play a particularly prominent role at this early 
stage. The day before the Postamble was published, the LHR made a public statement that it 
would not accept a general amnesty; however the publication of the Postamble a day later 
does not appear to have elicited any public response from the LHR. One explanation for this 
is that the LHR, as did other members of the human rights community, understood the 
wording of the Postamble to be open-ended enough to allow for the possibility of an 
“acceptable amnesty” from a human rights perspective. It is still surprising, given its well-
developed and sophisticated views on the issue of amnesty, that the LHR did not play more 
of a central role in the early drafting sessions of the TRC legislation.  
 
As van der Merwe et al state, it was only at a later stage, when the Bill was put to the public 
for comment in as late as November 1994 that “the NGO sector mobilised effectively to put 
their concerns on the table.”
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 My own research points to the same conclusion with the 
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exception of Alex Boraine, Albie Sachs and Kader Asmal and the important but indirect of 
involvement of some members of civil society and the human rights community in the 
conferences.  The next chapter goes on to deal with the actual submissions made by members 
















CHAPTER 5: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE AND 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRC LEGISLATION 
 
The previous chapter traced the linking up of the different agendas of the political elite, 
concerned with amnesty in the context of the negotiated constitutional settlement, and the 
civil society/human rights initiative led by Boraine who was concerned with the need for a 
victim-oriented truth and reconciliation process. Boraine was at the forefront of the initiatives 
by civil society and the human rights community in organising and coordinating the two 
major transitional justice workshops discussed in the previous chapter. These workshops 
presented the human rights community with an opportunity to voice any principled objections 
they might have had against the prospect of an amnesty from a human rights perspective. 
There was however no such principled rejection of amnesty from the human rights 
community. Instead the discourse surrounding of the issue of the “dealing with the past” was 
one of “truth” and “reconciliation”. This implies that amnesty had not been a major human 
rights issue for the human rights community as compared to other priorities.  
 
An initial drafting process in which Boraine and other “insiders” were involved had already 
taken place by the time that civil society more broadly was given the opportunity to make 
proposals/comments on legislation for the TRC. This happened in two main phases which are 
discussed separately in this chapter. The first opportunity came on 7 June 1994 when 
Minister Omar invited proposals from the public regarding the setting up of a truth 
commission to be submitted by the end of June 1994. The second opportunity for civil society 
and the public to comment on the draft TRC Bill was in November 1994 when the Ministry 
of Justice released a copy of the draft TRC legislation into the public domain and invited 
submissions from the public.  
 
In Omar‟s announcement in June 1994, and also his address at the second transitional justice 
conference, it was made clear that the two agendas for a victim-centred truth process on the 
one hand and an “amnesty-for-truth” process on the other would be linked to form a truth 
commission. This was further entrenched in the draft legislation that was published in 
November 1994. It is significant that once the two agendas for a victim-centred truth 
commission and an amnesty process were linked up with the inclusion of Boraine in the 
initial informal drafting phase of the TRC legislation, the issue of amnesty could no longer be 















announcements and the draft TRC Bill, the human rights community was responding not only 
to the idea of a truth commission as such but also to the issue of amnesty.  One can conceive 
of a range of possible responses from the human rights community: i) the human rights 
community could have rejected the notion of linking a victim-centred truth process with the 
amnesty and insisted that the truth commission remain an exclusively victim-centred process; 
ii) they could have largely ignored the provision for amnesty focusing only on the other 
aspects of the proposed truth commission; iii) they could have been specifically concerned 
with whether the amnesty provided for in the TRC Bill would amount to a general and 
unconditional amnesty and/or to what extent the provisions in the Bill for an individual and 
conditional amnesty were more justifiable from a human rights perspective and/or from the 
perspective of the victims. 
 
The two rounds of proposals and submissions are discussed separately in this chapter paying 
particular attention to the aspects of the submissions that dealt with the amnesty provision. 
Together, the submissions on a wide range of issues are taken as indications of the approach 
of the human rights community to the issue of amnesty. The significance of the human rights 
community‟s response is gauged according to what extent their responses represented a 
principled human rights approach to the issue of amnesty. A secondary objective of the 
chapter is to establish what impact the submissions from the human rights community had on 
the eventual TRC legislation. 
 
5.1 First round of submissions, June/July 1994 
 
The first round of submissions were based on Omar‟s June announcement of an official truth 
commission that would incorporate the mandate to receive applications for amnesty and that 
would make a space for the voices of victims to be heard.
249
 Some of the submissions only 
came after the 30 June deadline following Minister Omar‟s address at the second Healing of 
a Nation? Conference held in June 1994. The June announcement, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, only set out the very basic tenets of the proposed truth commission 
including the amnesty process. Essentially Omar announced that a truth commission would 
be set up with the overall objectives of truth and acknowledgement for the sake of “avoiding 
a multiplicity of legal actions”, “healing the wounds of the past”, avoiding future violations, 
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and also hearing the “voices of the victims.” Omar announced that the terms of reference of 
the commission would be to investigate and establish truth and acknowledgement of human 
rights violations, with regard to “fair procedures” and thus making the victims as well as the 
perpetrators known. He also said: “Truth telling responds to the demand for justice for the 
victims and facilitates national reconciliation.” In terms of the provision for amnesty, Omar 
announced that in the context of the overall truth commission legislation provision would be 
made for amnesty/indemnity. Omar set out the following in relation to “amnesty/indemnity”: 
 
1. The Commission may set up a specialised structure to deal with all applications and 
recommendations 
2. The cut-off date in respect of offences committed will be no later than 5 December 
1993 
3. The offences in respect of which amnesty may be applied for will be strictly defined 
within the framework of the constitutional provision on national unity and 
reconciliation 
4. The recommendations of the Commission shall be referred to the president whose 
decision will be final 
5. There will be a fixed cut-off date for applications. All persons seeking 
amnesty/indemnity will be required to submit applications by not later than such date. 
 
Significantly, Omar did not explicitly say that the granting of amnesty for human rights 
violations would be conditional on full-disclosure. In his address at the Healing of a Nation? 
conference, Omar announced that there would be three committees operating under the TRC, 
one of which would be the amnesty committee and that each would be chaired by a 
Commission member.
250
 On the “Committee on Amnesty or Indemnity” Omar reiterated the 
provisions made in his 7 June announcement but this time announced that a “precondition for  
indemnity or amnesty is full disclosure” and that there would “broadly speaking” be a return 
to the Norgaard principles applied in the 1990 Indemnity Act. Again Omar couched his 
address in terms of “healing the wounds of the past” while taking care to stress that “the 
object of the [commission] is not to conduct a witch-hunt or to haul violations of human 
rights before court to face charges” but rather “a necessary exercise to enable South African 
to come to terms with their past on a morally acceptable basis and to advance the cause of 
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 Omar left open questions such as whether the hearings would be held in 
camera or in public, whether perpetrators implicated in testimonies should be named, whether 
perpetrators should be allowed to hold public office and what procedures should be enacted 




It should be noted that by the time of Omar‟s June announcements, and indeed, by the time 
the initial round of comments and proposals had been submitted by some organisations, a 
draft legislative framework for a truth commission had already been drawn up by the „insider‟ 
group of which Alex Boraine was a key instigator and member, discussed in the previous 
chapter.
253
 This draft was not however made public. Whether or not the human rights 
community had any knowledge of this first „insider‟ draft is not entirely clear. 
 







 and the Human Rights Commission.
257
 These submissions 
were distinct to the subsequent submissions responding to the draft legislation published in 
November 1994. The proposal made by Graeme Simpson on behalf of CSVR took the format 
of a draft framework for TRC bill with detailed explanations, while other proposals focused 
only on a few general issues relating to the TRC and the amnesty process. This subsection 
focuses on the general approach of these human rights organisations in the first round of 
submissions to the concept of an amnesty process as part of a truth commission process. A 
discussion of the more specific proposals for the implementation of the amnesty process is 
held over for the discussion of the second round of submissions as there are a number of 
repetitions and overlaps. 
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Overall, the first round of submissions by the human rights community in response to Omar‟s 
call of 7 June 1994 were supportive both of the idea of a truth commission generally as well 
as of the linkage of such a truth commission to a mechanism to grant amnesty to perpetrators 
of gross human rights.  Significantly, these human rights organisations did not reject the 
notion of amnesty for human rights violations in their responses but instead accepted the 
amnesty provision and offered proposals for the ways in which it could be implemented. 
Thus the CSVR accepted that, in the context of the negotiated settlement, amnesty had 
become necessary for a peaceful transition and political stability.
258
 However the CSVR‟s 
general conception of the TRC was as a truth-telling process that “must be responsive to the 
demands of the victims rather than those of the perpetrators.”
259
  Steve Kahanovitz on behalf 
of the Legal Resources Centre in August 1994 wrote a short letter to the Minister of Justice 
Dullah Omar, of “some thoughts” that the Minister might consider incorporating into the 
concept of a truth commission.
260
 In the letter Kahanovitz also emphasised that victims 
should “feel as if the new state is listening to them.”
261
  As with the LRC, the Human Rights 
Commission, a civil society-based human rights organisation, which had been involved in 
recording and monitoring political violence and human rights abuses in the apartheid era, 
commended the Ministry of Justice for committing itself to a truth commission that would 
investigate human rights abuses on the one hand and also grant amnesty to perpetrators on the 
other.
 262
  These statements may indicate that these organisations were not particularly 
concerned with the implications of linking the amnesty process and the truth commission 
process. In practice (and in retrospect), the incorporation of the amnesty into the TRC 
amounted to a considerable shift from a victim-oriented truth process to one that included a 
focus on perpetrators. From the LRC and CSVR‟s submissions it appears that despite the 
inclusion of a mechanism for amnesty they considered that the TRC could still be sufficiently 
victim-focused.  
 
In his submission on behalf of the CSVR‟s Graeme Simpson engaged with the “punish or 
pardon” debate but conceded that ultimately “it is the complex politics of the transition which 
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largely shapes the policy debate involved.”
263
CSVR noted an earlier argument put forth by 
Africa Watch, the African division of the international human rights organisation Human 
Rights Watch, in the context of the 1992 Indemnity Act, that the state has an obligation under 
international law to investigate and punish gross human rights abuses but argued that it was 
sufficient for the government to be committed to the principle of accountability.
264
 The 
implication of this argument is that the CSVR considered that providing an amnesty for gross 
human rights abuses in exchange for full truth disclosure could be compatible with the 
“principle of accountability”.   According to the CSVR submission this could consist of a 
process of full public disclosure through a truth commission which entailed an extra-judicial 
punitive element (public shaming), but should also include an “additional punitive element 
which may fall short of criminal prosecution” such as the removal from office of human 
rights perpetrators, or lustration.
265
 CSVR‟s concern was that such an additional punitive 
element should not be so harsh that its effect would be to deter perpetrators from coming to 
the commission to seek amnesty and compromise the objective of information gathering 
“which is ultimately vital to national building and reconciliation.”
266
 Since the CSVR had not 
been privy to the “insider” discussions on linking the Postamble‟s amnesty to a truth 
commission, its proposal suggested that the CSVR independently agreed with the notion of 
the “truth for amnesty” compromise. The CSVR‟s submission was submitted well before 
Omar‟s announcement of the proposed TRC at the Healing of a Nation? Conference and 
therefore indicates a remarkable anticipation of later developments addressed by most only in 
response to the November 1994 draft of the TRC legislation.  
 
The LHR submitted a proposal in June/July 1994 supporting the principle of a truth 
commission which would “be a departure from the practices of the past government granting 
amnesty by means of secret deliberations” and that would establish and acknowledge the 
truth about human rights violations as well as ensure that such human rights atrocities were 
not repeated in South Africa.
267
 The LHR stated a number of “aims and objectives” for a 
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 LHR 1994,  p.1 As did CSVR, LHR made comments of specific aspects of the amnesty process including 1) 
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proposed truth commission two of which were 1) “to consider applications for 
amnesty/indemnity, upon confession from perpetrators of human rights violations” and 2) “to 
hold those who committed human rights violations accountable and to recommend measures 
to be taken against them."
268
 Exactly what measures the LHR had in mind was not made clear 
in their proposal. Overall however, it appears that, as with the CSVR, the LHR did not have 
principled objections to the provision for amnesty as part of a truth commission. 
 
Taken together the proposals from these members of the human rights community represent a 
general acquiescence with the provision for amnesty linked to a truth commission. Rather 
than taking a principled stand against amnesty the proposals generally took a „cooperative‟ 
approach making suggestions for how the amnesty process and truth commission could be 
implemented. Importantly, these organisations conceived of the truth commission which 
included the mechanism for amnesty as still being responsive to the demands of victims. 
However, the inclusion of the “amnesty for truth” compromise in the mandate of the truth 
commission represented a significant shift to a focus on perpetrators. It seems that the human 
rights community were not at the time aware of the implications of this shift for the TRC as a 
primarily victim-centred process. The proposals represent an approach taken by the human 
rights community that accepted the provision for amnesty but that still made some efforts to 
modify the amnesty so as to be more compatible with human rights principles.   
 




An official draft of the TRC legislation was published in November 1994 providing a second 
opportunity for civil society to make an input. This round of submissions elicited 
contributions from a wider range of civil society and human rights organisations. Various 
working groups or coalitions of NGOs were formed for the sake of coordinating a response; 
these included the KwaZulu Natal NGO Forum and the Religious Response to the TRC. 
Justice in Transition also played a crucial facilitating role in encouraging NGOs to make 
submissions.
270
 In the event there were in excess of 70 submissions on the TRC Bill made 
between November 1994 and May 1995.  
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While many organisations made independent submissions, others signed off on joint 
submissions made on behalf of a number of organisations. For example, the Justice in 
Transition network made a single submission, presented by Alex Boraine on behalf of 21 
non-governmental organisations including academics, human rights organisations, legal 
NGOs and religious groups.
271
  The KwaZulu Natal NGO Forum also made a submission on 
behalf of a number of organisations.
272
 Human rights organisations that made separate 
submissions were the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), the Black 
Sash, Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), the Legal Resources Centre (LHR). Other civil 
society organisations,
273





 and international organisations
276
 also made separate 
submissions.  Taken together these submissions by civil society and core representatives of 
the human rights community indicated a substantial involvement in the parliamentary process 
shaping the TRC legislation. The following account and discussion will pay particular 
attention to submissions on the amnesty aspect of the draft Bill by members of the SA human 
rights community. 
 
5.2.1 General responses from the human rights community to the draft TRC Bill 
 
On the whole the human rights community responded positively to the call for submissions 
on the draft bill and generally acquiesced with the amnesty provisions for perpetrators of 
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 Submissions by members of the human rights community, 
whether made separately or as joint submissions with other civil society-based organisations, 
indicated broad support for the proposed truth commission as well as an acceptance of the 
amnesty process.   
   
Human rights organisations such as CSVR, LHR and the Black Sash indicated that while they 
were otherwise opposed to amnesty in principle they were prepared to go along with it in the 
South African case. They justified their acquiescence with the amnesty process on the basis 
that in the context of the political negotiations amnesty was necessary to secure a peaceful 
transition.
278
 This reasoning was generally along the lines of that given by the Black Sash: 
 
 …We believe that amnesty provisions are in contravention of the rule of law and in 
contravention of many international human rights instruments. And we are very 
concerned [that] the granting of amnesty to those who have committed gross human 
rights violations of human rights may even further erode the rule of law in this country. 
 
Nevertheless we recognise that the transition to a democratically elected Government has 
had to be affected through a process of negotiation and compromise and that … amnesty 





There was unanimous agreement amongst these human rights organisations of the need for, 
and value of, exposing the truth about past human rights violations through a truth 
commission. Many organisations perceived this to be the main objective of the proposed truth 
commission and offered it also as a reason for their support of the amnesty process implying 
that the amnesty provisions in the TRC Bill were clearly understood as different from a 
general amnesty with full disclosure as a key condition.
280
  This was largely on the basis of 
the belief that the truth regarding their human rights violations to be disclosed by amnesty 
applicants would serve to promote reconciliation. Black Sash for example said: “We believe 
that it will be possible through the amnesty provision to arrive at the truth of the past and 
                                                          
277
 Notes from the Justice in Transition workshop, as well as the submission that emanated from that workshop 
included a long list of NGOs, including many human rights organisations that had been involved  
278
 See Simpson 1994, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 1995. Submission to the Select 
Committee on Justice: The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Bill, January 13, p.7; LHR 1994,  
279
 Black Sash. 1995. Oral Submission to the Justice Portfolio Commission, February 8,  p. 3 of transcript 
280
 See KwaZulu Natal NGO Forum. 1995. Oral Submission to the Justice Portfolio Commission, February 14.  

















 while the KZN NGO forum “agree[d] unanimously that a 
commission of this nature is necessary to enable the country to heal its wounds, to promote a 
sense of tolerance and forgiveness and to recognise the suffering and hardship of those who 




However, this did not quite amount to a unanimous consensus among the human rights 
submissions. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) was the one organisation that came close to 
an outright rejection of the amnesty on principled human rights grounds. This time around, 
the LHR submission supported the notion of a truth commission to establish and disclose the 
truth about human rights violations but did not support the amnesty component of the 
proposed Commission.
283
 As such, and unlike others in the human rights community, the 
LHR did not view the proposed TRC as an acceptable alternative to retributive justice 
through criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators of human rights violations. LHR argued that 
the amnesty as it was defined in the draft Bill amounted to impunity and that amnesty should 
instead be defined as “a pardon from the state granted to convicted persons with or without 
conditions.”
284
 The qualifications of individual and conditional amnesty, instead of a general 
amnesty, did not make a relevant difference in the LHR‟s view. In their opinion, the 
“amnesty” proposed in the draft Bill amounted to de facto impunity, effectively placing 
perpetrators above the law. Referring to the Interim Constitution and to the norms of 
international law, the LHR argued that the rights of victims to judicial redress, equality before 
the law and equal protection by the law were contravened by the amnesty as proposed in the 
Bill.
285
 This comes close to a clear and principled rejection of the amnesty provisions from a 
human rights perspective. However, the LHR stopped short of rejecting the amnesty outright 
by proposing that only convicted perpetrators could be considered for a presidential pardon. 
The LHR indicated that it valued and shared the general commitment to reconciliation as an 
objective of the proposed TRC but unlike other submissions proposed that reconciliation 
would be better advanced if convicted perpetrators only were considered for amnesty.
286
  
Accordingly it was argued that granting amnesty to perpetrators without first prosecuting and 
convicting them would “…in the long term, fail to achieve even the objective enshrined in its 
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name - that of the promotion of genuine national unity and reconciliation.”
287
 The LHR 
contended that investigations and prosecutions were “essential steps towards achieving 
national reconciliation and lasting peace” in South Africa.
288
   
 
The LHR‟s approach to the amnesty provision as contained in the draft bill was markedly 
different from the approach taken by other members of the human rights community. LHR 
argued on these grounds that investigations and prosecutions of human rights atrocities 
should take place as part of addressing past human rights violations. Bearing in mind the 
analogous human rights movement in the Argentine case this approached the kind of 
principled human rights approach to the issue of amnesty that might have been expected from 
the South African human rights community more generally. However, the LHR‟s proposal 
that only convicted perpetrators be eligible for amnesty stopped short of an outright rejection 
of amnesty and so cannot be said to represent a principled human rights stand on amnesty 
analogous to that taken by the Argentine human rights movement. 
 
It appears that overall the human rights community viewed the TRC (as a truth process and as 
a mechanism for not a general amnesty but an amnesty that was individual and conditional) 
as compatible with their concern for the needs of victims as well as in line with their previous 
criticisms of the previous indemnity acts which were shrouded in secretive process and did 
not facilitate truth recovery. 
 
5.2.2 The “truth-for amnesty” compromise: Full-disclosure as condition for amnesty 
 
The stated objective of the draft TRC Bill to investigate and expose the truth about past gross 
human rights violations was enthusiastically welcomed by the human rights community. 
According to these organisations the aims of the truth commission should be to acknowledge 
the truth about past political atrocities and especially the suffering of victims with a view to 
restore the dignity of victims and to promote reconciliation and healing as well as 
forgiveness. The human rights community understood the central objective of the truth 
commission as that of a victim-oriented truth process.
289
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 Most submissions did not explicitly refer to the significance of the full-disclosure condition 
for amnesty. However, the demand from the human rights community that full-disclosure be 
made in public, as discussed in the next subsection, implied that the full-disclosure aspect of 
the amnesty was a crucial condition for their support of the commission and its overall 
objective of uncovering and exposing the truth about the past.  In particular, unlike other 
amnesties which served to cover up the truth, an amnesty based on full disclosure would do 
the opposite. 
   
A related issue raised by some HROs was that of the publication of the names of perpetrators 
receiving amnesties. Evidently this should have been an implication of the “truth-for-
amnesty” compromise and of full disclosure as a condition for granting amnesty to 
applicants. Section 16 (3) of the draft Bill stated that the Committee shall publish in the 
Government Gazette the full names of any person to whom amnesty is granted as well as 
“sufficient information to identify the act or omission in respect of which amnesty has been 
granted”. A few submissions, including those from the CSVR, the LHR, and the KZN NGO 
Forum took exception to this, arguing that the interpretation of “sufficient information” was 
too vague.
290
 It was suggested by the CSVR that the following additional information be 
published by the Amnesty Committee: the names of other people who assisted in committing 
the crime and who had full knowledge of the crime including its planning; the full details of 
the planning of the crime; the motive of the crime; the chain of command and how it was 
executed; the place where the crime occurred or was intended to occur, the names of the 
victims and/or intended victims and also the name of the organisation, security force or any 





Also related to the “truth” objective of the amnesty process was clause 16(8) in the draft Bill 
which said that if persons who prior to the Commission had been convicted of human rights 
violations were granted amnesty by the Commission for the said violation(s) then they would 
have their criminal records “expunged from all official documents or records and the 
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conviction shall for all purposes, including the application of any Act of Parliament or any 
other law, be deemed to have not taken place.” The KZN NGO Forum and the LHR opposed 
the proposed eradication of the criminal records of persons granted amnesty.
292
 They argued 
that this would run contradictory to the purposes of the truth commission to record and 





We may conclude from these submissions that at this time the human rights community was 
not exclusively, or even primarily, concerned with the claims of retributive justice in relation 
to the perpetrators of gross human rights violations but much more with a victim-oriented 
process of “truth”. This may go some way in accounting for their willingness to go along 
with the amnesty compromise which included full-disclosure as a condition. Their 
preoccupation was with the objectives of a truth process, namely of providing closure to 
victims, of affording them acknowledgement and dignity as well as providing for the 
possibility of “healing”, “forgiveness” and “reconciliation”, rather than with those of 
retributive justice in relation to perpetrators.  
 
5.2.3 The issue of „closed door‟ versus public amnesty hearings 
 
Perhaps the single most controversial aspect of the draft TRC Bill was the issue whether the 
amnesty hearings would be open to the public or held behind closed doors. This was by far 
the most contested issue in the submissions by the human rights sector, certainly more so than 
the amnesty itself. The stated objective of the proposed Commission was to establish the 
„truth‟ about past political atrocities and „full disclosure‟ was to be a condition of granting 
amnesty to applicants. Yet section 15(2)(b) of the draft Bill stated that all procedures with 
regard to the hearing and granting of amnesty would be held behind closed doors. This meant 
that the general public would not be able to attend the hearings and would effectively be 
denied any direct access to the proceedings of the amnesty hearings. It followed that the 
public would only come to know of the disclosures by perpetrators via statements relayed by 
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The submissions from the human rights community rejected the provisions that the amnesty 
hearings be held in camera. It was argued that such a secrecy clause would significantly 
compromise the truth commission‟s objective to uncover the truth and would negate the spirit 
and values of reconciliation which the truth commission purported to promote.
295
 The Black 
Sash wrote that open amnesty hearings would help to uncover the truth to the fullest possible 
extent and that this was “essential for the according of respect and dignity to the victims of 
human rights abuses and for seeking means of reparation.”
296
 The LRC also stated that “the 
truth commission is meant to play a cleansing and healing role, and for this to happen 
effectively, transparency is needed.”
297
 In its 1995 Submission the CSVR wrote that if 
hearings were to be held in secret it would “…inhibit reconciliation because for many victims 
and their dependents the past will remain unresolved. It is difficult to achieve genuine 
forgiveness in the absence of knowledge. Society in general and victims in particular will be 
unable to properly come to terms with the past until they are presented with an accurate and 




So strongly did the human rights community feel about this issue that it was prepared to make 
it into a condition for its own support of, and participation in, the TRC process. The human 
rights community along with other representatives of civil society held that unless the clause 
providing for secret amnesty hearings was scrapped their future participation in the TRC 
would be jeopardised.
299
 Significantly it was stated that the human rights community had 
already compromised on amnesty but that it could not also compromise on the amnesty 
hearings being in secret.
300
 Given that most organisations motivated their support for the 
amnesty process because of its potential to provide victims and the nation the truth about the 
past and to provide official acknowledgement of this truth, it is not surprising that the notion 
of closed-door hearings prompted such an outcry from organisations. Organisations did 
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indeed actively campaign against these proposals and gained considerable media coverage for 




Justice in Transition and CSVR also opposed the proposals for closed-door amnesty hearings 
because these disregarded the TRC‟s (as well as the new government‟s) commitment to 
transparency, openness and accountability.
302
 The underlying concern was that this would 
render the granting of amnesties amenable to backdoor deals and political horse trading and 
in this way undermine the legitimacy of the truth commission and the new government.
 303
    
   
The human rights community‟s insistence that the hearings be in public represents an 
important stand taken by the human rights community to make the amnesty more compliant 
with a human rights perspective. Although there would be amnesty, a public amnesty process 
as compared to one held in secret would contradict the objective of truth recovery, the 
primary concern of the human rights community as evidenced in their submissions. 
 
5.2.4 The Amnesty Committee‟s status and role within the TRC process 
 
The Amnesty Committee, as the mechanism to deal with amnesty, served to give effect to the 
requirements of the Interim Constitution and the Postamble. Despite the fusion of the 
amnesty process and the truth commission initiative the Amnesty Committee retained a 
distinct identity, separate status and different procedures. The other committees of the TRC, 
the Human Rights Violations Committee and the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee, 
were specifically victim-oriented. It was the Amnesty Committee that would deal specifically 
with the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights. So, it was the composition and 
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location of the Amnesty Committee within the TRC that be of particular concern to the 
human rights community.  
 
Two major features of the provisions for the Amnesty Committees in the draft Bill were i) the 
requirement that they not only included judges but that the Amnesty Committee be chaired by 
a judge (who need not be Commissioners) appointed by the State President (and not by the 
Commission)
304
 and ii) that they did not report to the Commission but directly to the State 
President. The significance of these particular features was that i) in contrast to the victims 
hearings of the HVR Committee the amnesty hearings would take on a quasi-judicial form 
involving legal representation and elements of due process while ii) the Amnesty Committee 
would function semi-autonomously, effectively by-passing the Commission itself. The 
Amnesty Committee was to be neither subject to direction from or intervention by the 
Commission nor accountable to the Commission.  Both i) and ii) had to be of concern to the 
human rights community in relation to the amnesty issue, though in different ways. The 
central role of judges on the Amnesty Committee, making it a quasi-judicial process, could 
from a human rights perspective diminish principled objections to amnesty. But such a quasi-
judicial amnesty process could also be more effective in protecting the rights of perpetrators 
while marginalising victims‟ access and rights as well as being less conducive to bringing 
about any kind of victim-perpetrator reconciliation.  Similarly ii), the semi-autonomous 
functioning of the Amnesty Committee, could be conceived either as insulating the amnesty 
process from external or political interference or as conversely making it more susceptible to 
that.   
 
Significantly the human rights submissions on the draft Bill did not comment on these aspects 
of the draft Bill. Only the LHR questioned the special appointment procedure of the Amnesty 
Committee, arguing that too much power was vested in the President and the Minister of 
Justice thereby calling into question the political independence of the Amnesty Committee. 
But rather than pursuing this point they argued that:  
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The special appointments procedure of the amnesty committee places the emphasis in the Bill 
on Amnesty rather than on investigation and recording of human rights violations and 




This may be taken as an indication that the human rights community had not yet taken on 
board the perpetrator-oriented focus of the amnesty process and was still mainly concerned 
with the notion of a victim-oriented truth and reconciliation process. 
 
From their submissions it is clear that the human rights organisations were aware that the 
Amnesty Committee would be quasi-judicial in nature. But it is not entirely clear how the 
human rights community conceived of the nature of the amnesty process in general, and of 
the composition and location of the amnesty committee in particular, in relation to the overall 
TRC process. Presumably they still assumed that the amnesty process could somehow serve 
the same objectives of victim-oriented „truth‟ and „reconciliation‟. It was only much later, in 
the course of the parliamentary debates on the Bill, and at the insistence mainly of the 
National Party, that a clause more explicitly entrenching the Amnesty Committee‟s 
distinctive status and role from that of the TRC was inserted: 
 
No decision, or the process of arriving at such a decision, of the Committee on Amnesty 




Further entrenching the Amnesty Committee‟s distinctive role within the TRC process was 
Mandela‟s appointment of Judge Hassen E. Mall -- who was not a commissioner of the TRC 
-- as chairperson of the Amnesty Committee in December 1995. Boraine records that he and a 
few others stressed the need for the chairperson of the Amnesty Committee to be a TRC 
commissioner and also for any amnesty decisions to be reviewed by the full commission, but 
these proposals were turned down.
307
 There is little in the submissions to confirm that 
Boraine or others took issue with these provisions at this time, however it is true that the 
implications of these provisions became more pronounced only subsequent to the draft 
published in November 1994.  
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5.2.5 Scope of the Amnesty Committee: definition of gross human rights violations and “acts 
associated with a political objective” 
 
The definition of gross human rights violations would determine the scope of the amnesty 
applications to be dealt with by the Amnesty Committee. The draft Bill defined gross 
violations of human rights to include “killing, attempted killing, abduction, severe ill-
treatment or torture of any person during the period 1 March 1960 to 5 December 1993.”
308
 
Arguably this consequential definition of gross human rights violations should have been 
problematic for the human rights community. Certainly, the majority of human rights 
violation in apartheid South Africa was not of this kind of direct gross violations such as 
killing, attempted killing, abduction, torture, etc. While gross human rights violations 
(murder, torture, kidnapping etc) were committed against political dissidents and activists (as 
in Latin America), the majority of crimes that characterised apartheid were those which 
systematically denied non-white citizens their political, social and economic rights on a daily 
basis. Apartheid itself had been declared „a crime against humanity‟ by the United Nations; it 
constituted a system of racial injustice and inequality that penetrated all levels of society. 
Accordingly, the focus of the human rights community‟s activities during the years of 
apartheid was to remedy and limit the human right violations suffered by black people in this 
regard. But the greater part of these systemic and collective violations of human rights was 
not covered by the definition of “gross human rights violations” in the draft Bill.  
 
Significantly, though, the human rights organisations generally did not object to the draft 
Bill‟s definition of gross human rights violations. Instead many submissions noted that the 
limitation of the truth commission to the serious human rights violations was necessary in 
order for the process to be manageable within a limited time frame.
309
 Mostly these 
organisations acknowledged that the definitions did not deal with the “broad crimes against 
humanity inherent in the Apartheid system” because almost the entire population had been 
subjected to these crimes and that in practice it would not be possible for the commission to 
deal with all these crimes.
310
 The human rights community was thus more concerned with 
pragmatic considerations rather than the larger implications of these definitions. However, 
the definitions of gross human rights violations actually had important implications and 
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consequences for both victims and perpetrators. In terms of the victims a broader definition of 
gross human rights violations, namely one that included some of the more systemic violations 
suffered under apartheid, would have had major implications i) for relevant participants in, 
and the focus of,  the victims hearings and ii) for those qualifying for reparations. In relation 
to perpetrators a broader definition of gross human rights violations would similarly have 
extended the scope of those who needed to apply for amnesty But the submissions were not 
particularly concerned with the complicity of 'bystanders' and „beneficiaries‟, nor more 
generally with the systemic and social injustice of the apartheid system. 
 
Another key feature of the amnesty that may have raised objections from the human rights 
community had to with the definition of acts committed with a “political objective” as a 
justification for amnesty for human rights violations.  The draft Bill said that amnesty could 
be granted for acts committed by: 
 
a) members and supporters of a publicly known political organisation or liberation 
movement who committed acts in furtherance of a related political objective in the 
course of the political turmoil  
 
b) any member of the security forces who “in the course and scope of his or her duties 
and within the scope of his or her express or implied authority directed against a 
publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in political 
struggle against the state or a former state by civil war/ insurrection or political 




 From a human rights perspective this could have been of special concern in so far as it went 
directly against the Nuremberg principle that “superior orders” could not be invoked in 
justification of human rights abuses. This raises the question of why violations committed 
with a political objective could be considered for amnesty but not other crimes. Is the 
implication that human rights violations with a political objective are less problematic than 
those with a non-political objective? On the question of “superior orders” the first submission 
by CSVR raised the point that it could imply a dangerous principle in government that 
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“officials may use criminal means in the execution of State objectives because … 
government will be protected by virtue of the fact that they acted as officials under orders.”
312
 
Aside from this point made by CSVR, no other submissions considered the issue. Again this 
stands in stark contrast to the Argentine human rights community who rejected Alfonsin‟s 
attempts to narrow down prosecutions by prosecuting only those who were responsible for 
giving out orders while “excusing” lower ranked officers on the grounds that they were acting 
under orders. 
 
5.2.6 The Implications of Amnesty for Victims‟ Rights to Claim Civil Liability 
 
The draft Bill made provision for indemnity against criminal and civil liability for human 
rights violations.
313
 In terms of criminal liability, granting perpetrators amnesty effectively 
precluded state prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations. Regarding civil 
liability, the proposed amnesty furthermore prevented victims from instituting civil 
proceedings against their alleged perpetrators and would effectively annul the rights of 
victims‟ to claim civil remedies from their alleged perpetrators. While the submissions from 
human rights organisations indicated a general willingness to go along with the indemnity for 
the criminal liability of perpetrators of gross human rights violations, the indemnity for their 
civil liability elicited some criticisms and objections. The context of this was the involvement 
of some organisations, particularly LHR and LRC, in civil claims instituted against the 
Minister of Law and Order especially in the aftermath of the Harms and Goldstone 
Commissions as discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
The KZN NGO Forum argued that in general the right not to institute criminal proceedings is 
vested in the state and so therefore it is the prerogative of the state to grant amnesty against 
prosecution. However this should not restrict the rights of an individual to institute private 
prosecutions. They argued that amnesty from civil liability would infringe on the individual‟s 
right to claim compensation/remedy in respect of losses/damages by instituting civil 
proceedings.
314
 Some human rights organisations maintained in their submissions that 
amnesty should not prevent victims from bringing civil claims against their perpetrators as 
this would violate the rights of victims to claim compensation for losses and damages 
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  However, few of the submissions discussed or explained how amnesty for 
criminal liability but not for civil liability could possibly have been practically feasible. The 
Black Sash simply said that it would be acceptable for the new government to be immune 
from civil claims, but that alleged perpetrators who may be living off the proceeds of services 




In general, the human rights community reasoned that perpetrators should be civilly liable 
because it was the right of the victim to be adequately compensated for damages suffered. 
Many organisations conceded that should the state make provisions for reparations to be paid 
to victims then this may stand in lieu of civil claims against individual perpetrators.
317
 This is 
again demonstrative of the human rights community‟s primary concern for the needs of 
victims as the focus of the truth commission as opposed to claims for (retributive) justice. 
Nonetheless the suggestions of the human rights community amount to an attempt to make 




5.2.7 Extra-judicial Sanctions: Lustration and Naming 
 
Almost all the submissions by human rights organisations were critical of the fact that the 
Bill made no provision for extra-judicial sanctions such as „lustration‟ (i.e. disqualifying 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations from holding official or public positions) in 
conjunction with amnesty. Most in the human rights community were of the view that 
amnesty recipients should not be eligible for, nor continue to hold, public office.
319
 It was 
suggested that the Amnesty Committee should be empowered to bar amnesty recipients from 
holding public office or positions of authority. Furthermore, those who received amnesty for 
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human rights abuses should be prohibited from serving in the police force, defence forces or 
security forces generally.
320
   
 
The CSVR‟s rationale for lustration of those granted amnesty was partly „forward-looking‟ 
saying that unless these perpetrators were removed from public office transformation of these 
institutions would be difficult.
321
 CSVR and the LHR did however also conceive of lustration 
as a punitive measure and as an additional way of holding perpetrators accountable.
322
 CSVR 
held that the absence from the draft TRC Bill of a “lesser sanction, short of criminal 
prosecution or civil liability” was unacceptable as it allowed “people who have murdered, 
abducted and tortured to have done so with complete impunity.”
323
 It conceded that 
publication of the names of those granted amnesty would constitute a form of sanction 
against perpetrators (a measure of public shaming) but maintained that it was not enough and 
that amnesty recipients should also be removed from public office. The LHR similarly 
submitted that “those who committed human rights violations must be held accountable and 
the Commission should be able to recommend other measures which may be taken against 




The suggestion to include lustration as an extra punitive measure for perpetrators receiving 
amnesty is evidence again of an attempt by the human rights community to make amnesty 
more compatible with concerns of retributive justice. However, apart from the suggestion that 
perpetrators be removed from public office, the submissions did not make suggestions for 
how civil society institutions themselves could become involved in lustration. It is 
conceivable that civil society and professional associations could have played a role in 
lustration by disbarring medical professionals who had been involved or complicit in torture 
for example. 
 
5.2.8 Amnesty and „Even-handed‟ Justice 
 
It was well-established that both the apartheid state and the liberation movements had 
engaged in political violence during past conflicts.  The ANC had been committed to the 
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“armed struggle” which included sabotage, bombings, armed assaults etc. in some cases 
involving civilian targets. Whether these constituted human rights violations depended on 
one‟s interpretation of just war principles. On the “just cause” interpretation political violence 
used in defence of the unjust apartheid regime constituted human rights violations but not the 
political violence used in the armed struggle against apartheid rule. So on this interpretation 
amnesty was needed for agents defending apartheid but not for combatants who had been 
involved in the armed liberation struggle. On the alternate “justice in war” interpretation, 
human rights violations are possible on both sides regardless of “just cause”. The issue of 
exactly who need apply for amnesty or else face possible prosecution for human rights 
violations thus arose.
325
 It was stated in the draft Bill that gross violation of human rights 
included those by “a) an agent, member or supporter of the State, any former state or political 
organisation or movement; or b) any other person active with a political motive”
326
 This 
suggested a “justice in war” rather than a “just cause” interpretation, and implied that not 
only state agents but also members of the liberation movement would need to apply for 
amnesty for gross human rights violations. 
  
The Human Rights Commission, in its first submission, argued that the Commission should 
take an „even-handed‟ approach to human rights abuses.
327
 In its first submission in mid-
1994, CSVR also held that abuses of „all sides‟ of the political conflict in SA should be 
subject to investigation.
328
 Human rights organisations were concerned mainly with abuses 
committed by the apartheid government and forces but they were also concerned with human 
rights abuses committed in the course of the armed struggle. This view was compatible with a 
principled human rights response which treats all human rights violations equally regardless 
of who they are committed by and for what reason.  
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5.2.9 Complementary and Follow-up Prosecutions 
 
What was significant about (and unique to) the proposed amnesty was that perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations who did not apply for amnesty, or who were denied amnesty by 
the Amnesty Committee, were to be liable to prosecution in the new dispensation. It was 
mentioned earlier that the very fact that individuals had to apply for amnesty meant that it 
was not an automatic or a blanket amnesty such as the amnesties in Chile and Argentine. 
What distinguished this amnesty was therefore that only individuals granted amnesty were 
immune from prosecution. Implicit in this compromise then was an understanding that 
perpetrators who were refused amnesty, or did not apply for amnesty, could and would face 
prosecution. Without the counter-part of prosecutions, those who did not apply for amnesty, 
which was the majority of perpetrators of human rights violations, would have effective 
impunity comparable to those covered by a formal amnesty.
329
 Certainly, the human rights 
community could be supportive of the amnesty in so far as it was not an automatic blanket 
amnesty encouraging impunity but rather involved an individual and conditional application 
process providing not only a means to the truth but also some measure of accountability. 
Logically then, the complementary and follow-up prosecutions should have been a priority 
for these organisations.  
 
However, the draft Bill made no arrangements for, nor did it make explicit reference to, any 
such complementary or follow-up prosecutions. This momentous omission was noted only by 
the Black Sash which submitted its concern that the draft Bill made no provision for the 
handing over to the Attorney-General of cases where amnesty had been refused to be 
considered for prosecution.
330
 It also remarked on the fact that the Commission was not given 
any powers to direct the Attorney-General to prosecute. No other organisations took the issue 
up in any sustained way.   
 
Instead, in their submissions most human rights organisations drew attention to the proposed 
Commission‟s lack of a comprehensive strategy for an effective investigations unit and 
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 The lack of planning for an effective investigations unit was seen as a major 
defect in the draft Bill with some arguing that the success of the Commission was largely 
dependent on an effective investigations unit. Concern was also raised by historians and 
archivists that the TRC would have to rely on evidence from official records, much of which 
had been destroyed. The TRC would therefore need to make a special effort to recover these 




The strong emphasis on the need for a competent investigation unit and also for the need to 
prevent documents from being destroyed in anticipation of investigations by the TRC 
demonstrates the human rights community‟s priority for the truth to be made known. On the 
other hand, the fact that the human rights community did not pursue the „flipside‟ of the 
amnesty deal, namely the complementary and follow-up prosecutions demonstrate that they 
were not so much concerned with claims of retributive justice in relation to the perpetrators 
of gross human rights violations but more with the victim-oriented aspects of the truth 
process.  
 
5.3 Impact of the human rights community’s proposals 
 
After the Portfolio Committee received the written and oral submissions on the draft Bill, the 
Bill was extensively debated in parliament and among political parties. There was a 
protracted parliamentary process involving numerous rounds of debates on, and amendments 
to, the final legislation. This involved a complex set of interactions between officials in the 
Justice Department and members of the Select Committee on Justice who proposed repeated 
amendments. These developments are not the subject of this thesis and cannot be dealt with 
in any depth. 
 
However, a number of suggestions by the human rights community in their submissions on 
the draft TRC Bill were incorporated into the final TRC Act. The most significant of these 
and the one which was to have the greatest impact on the amnesty process was the final 
decision to hold public amnesty hearings. This suggestion was initially rejected by the 
government, mainly because of the pressure from the NP and right-wing groups to hold the 
amnesty hearings in private. The NP was so insistent that it was only after civil society and 
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the human rights community campaigned in favour of public amnesty hearings that the Bill 
was amended to allow for public hearings.
333
 This meant that the amnesty hearings would be 
open to the public and also to the media who could learn first hand of public disclosures 
made to the amnesty committee. 
 
The majority of suggestions made by the human rights community and discussed above were 
however ignored. Certainly the LHR‟s suggestion that amnesty only be granted to already 
convicted perpetrators was not incorporated into the Act. The suggestions of the human rights 
community for the amnesty to cover criminal liability only and not civil liability were 
rejected as were suggestions that the amnesty be accompanied by the lustration of 
perpetrators. The Black Sash‟s suggestion that the Act make provision for a prosecutions 





The submissions from the human rights community amounted to constructive input on the 
amnesty process with notably little principled opposition to the provision for amnesty. 
Although most of the human rights community‟s suggestions were not incorporated into  the 
TRC Act, finalised after further debate and drafting at the level of parliament and the Justice 
Portfolio Committee, it was only the issue of in-camera hearings that the human rights 
community rejected outright and followed up on with sustained protest action. This 
opportunity was afforded to the human rights community by virtue of the SA truth 
commission being created by parliamentary decree and with the input of civil society, unlike 
in the Argentine truth commission which was created by presidential decree and with limited 
or no public consultation. The parliamentary process for creating the truth commission made 
a remarkable difference to the eventual SA TRC process compared to truth commissions in 
both Chile and Argentine which were held in private and made known to the public only 
through a final report. While the Argentine government was fearful to conduct the truth 
commission as a parliamentary commission for fear that it might be too amenable to the 
“extreme” demands of the human rights movement, it would appear that Dullah Omar and the 
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new government did not have similar reservations regarding the anticipated response from 
civil society and the human rights movement. 
 
Regarding the human rights community‟s response to the mechanism of amnesty tied into the 
truth commission, one would imagine a significantly different response from the Argentine 
human rights community. Whereas the SA TRC incorporated a mechanism for amnesty, the 
Argentine truth commission was eventually handed over to the judiciary for the purpose of 
assisting prosecutions against perpetrators of human rights atrocities.  Furthermore, unlike the 
SA human rights community, many of whom reasoned that the amnesty was acceptable partly 
because it played a necessary function in the transition, the Argentine movement was 
insistent on the principle of retributive justice for the perpetrators of all human rights 
atrocities regardless of the implications for peace and political stability. According to their 
submissions, the majority of the human rights community‟s views were consonant with the 
spirit of the Postamble that postulated “in order to advance reconciliation and reconstruction, 
amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political 
objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.”
334
 The general discourse 
of the human rights community in the conferences and indeed in their submissions on the 
general aspects of the TRC confirms that, unlike the Argentine human rights movement, it 
was mostly sympathetic to these arguments. 
 
The implication of the submissions by the human rights organisations was that justice need 
not necessarily be achieved through through prosecutions and punishment of perpetrators of 
past political atrocities but that an individual and conditional amnesty tied into a truth 
commission with a focus on the victims was a satisfactory compromise. The submissions 
from the human rights community suggest that it was because of the special individual and 
conditional features of the amnesty that would promote truth recovery and that were granted 
within a context of a victim-centred mechanism for dealing with the past that the amnesty 
was an acceptable compromise. The submissions imply that a blanket amnesty would not 
have been acceptable in the same way as an individual amnesty conditional on full public 
disclosure was. Nonetheless, the prospect of amnesty for human rights atrocities, albeit 
individual and conditional, remains highly problematic from a human rights perspective.  
 

















CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Before concluding on the bases of the analysis thus far, the first part of this chapter gives a 
brief overview of the amnesty process and its aftermath with particular emphasis on the 
implications for further prosecutions, including the role of the human rights community in 
this regard. What role did the human rights community play in the amnesty committee and 
the implied complementary and follow-up prosecutions that were to take place in conjunction 
with the Amnesty Committee?  
 
6.1 The Amnesty Process and its aftermath: AZAPO, Prosecutions Policy, Presidential 
Pardons 
 
The TRC Act was signed into law on the 19
th
 July 1995 and came into effect with the 
appointment of the Commissioners on 15 December 1995. The selection of TRC 
Commissioners involved an extensive public nomination process driven largely by civil 
society. In the event some key members from the human rights community who had been 
involved in the TRC legislative process actually became TRC Commissioners while many 
others became involved in the commission in other ways.
335
  Boraine was elected Vice 
Chairperson of the Commission while other members of the human rights community were 
elected as commissioners including Mary Burton and Yasmin Sooka. This public nomination 
process did not extend to the selection of members for the Amnesty Committee who were 
instead appointed by the President with no public input.  
 
Soon after the signing in of the Act, the Amnesty Committee of the TRC was subjected to a 
legal challenge brought before the Constitutional Court on 1 July 1996 by the Azanian 
Peoples Organisation, a black consciousness movement, and relatives of five slain apartheid 
victims, namely Steve Biko, Victoria and Griffiths Mxenge, and Fabian and Frances 
Ribeiro.
336
 The claimants submitted to the court that the amnesty denied victims of human 
rights violations the opportunity to claim civil remedy which was in conflict with the 
Constitution. It was furthermore argued that the amnesty legislation was a breach of the 
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state‟s obligation under international law to investigate and prosecute gross human rights 
violations. 
 
The judgement delivered on 25 July 1996 by Mohammed DP rejected the application to have 
the amnesty declared unconstitutional and controversially declared that the South African 
amnesty was not in contravention of international law.
337
 The court case was not publicly 
supported by the human rights community – instead it was the initiative of this small group of 
family members of the victims and AZAPO. Considering the submissions from human rights 
organisations that the amnesty should not cover civil liability and that this was one of the key 
arguments made by the claimants in the AZAPO case, it is surprising that more members of 
the human rights community did not join the case. 
 
There was however some further criticism of the amnesty, not from the human rights 
community as such but from Khulumani Victim Support Group, a victim-based NGO formed 
in 1995 as a subsidiary of the CSVR. When it formed in 1995, Khulumani protested that the 
TRC had not adequately informed victims about the implications of amnesty for the victims 
before the hearings began.
338
 The victim organisation demonstrated their discontent by 
organising a picket outside the Johannesburg TRC office. To what extent the human rights 
community was sympathetic to Khulumani‟s protests would require further research. 
However, on the surface of it appears that the human rights community did not generally 
back Khulumani‟s protests. The protest and the court challenge by the relatives of the victims 
appeared to be the first genuine voices of protest against the amnesty. In the end however, 
these late challenges to the amnesty did not have any significant impact. 
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Volumes Six and Seven of the TRC Report, covering the work of the Amnesty Committee
were presented to the President only on 21 March 2003.
339
In total, the Amnesty Committee
registered 7115 applications.
340
Of these applications, 5489 were dealt with in chambers, and
the majority were rejected as they did not comply with the criteria of political motivation and 
were largely from opportunistic ordinary criminals.
341
Thus, the actual number of
applications is closer to 2500
342
of these only 1167 people received amnesty and 145 received
partial amnesty.
343
This is deemed to be a significantly low number and there is little doubt
that the number of perpetrators who received amnesty covered a small fraction of the gross
human rights violations that were committed between 1960 and 1994.
344
As Sarkin points
out, this is an especially low number when one considers that in the four year period in the 
lead up to the negotiations there were more than 16 000 deaths as a result of the political
struggle.
345
It also suggests that by the end of the amnesty process, there was still a large
number of individuals who, according to the terms of the amnesty in the TRC were liable for
prosecution.
The TRC Report recommended that prosecutions should go ahead for those who had not
applied for, or who had been denied amnesty:
Where amnesty has not been sought or has been denied, prosecution should be considered
where evidence exists that an individual has committed a gross human rights violation. In this 
regard, the Commission will make available to the appropriate authorities information in its
possession concerning serious allegations against individuals (excluding privileged 
information such as that contained in amnesty applications). Consideration must be given to 
imposing a time limit on such prosecutions. Attorneys-general must pay rigorous attention the
prosecution of members of the South African Police Service who are found to have assaulted
tortured and/or killed persons in their care.
346
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From a principled human rights perspective the government had a duty to investigate and 
prosecute cases beyond the work of the Amnesty Committee.
347
 At the time however, there
was “no dedicated body in the criminal justice system tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting political crimes of the past.”
348
 As pointed out in the previous chapter, the TRC
legislation did not make any provision for (or even mention of) a strategy for prosecutions for 
perpetrators who would be denied or not apply for amnesty. Significantly, there was no 
attempt on behalf of the human rights community to have this momentous omission rectified. 
The human rights community made virtually no comment on the need for follow-up 
prosecutions. 
In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that 15 years on from the TRC and 8 years on from
the closing of the Amnesty Committee, there is still much „unfinished business‟ regarding the
lack of follow-up prosecutions and that there has furthermore, until recently, been little action 
from the human rights community to deal with the problem.
349
Despite the legitimate
expectation that those who did not receive amnesty would be prosecuted through the criminal
justice system, only a few trials relating to apartheid human rights atrocities have been
conducted. These were generally poorly investigated and tried and resulted in just a few
convictions.
350
For various reasons, prosecutions were mostly put on hold until the Amnesty
Committee had concluded its work. However, even after the Amnesty Committee finished in 
2003, there have been almost no follow-up prosecutions. The South African National 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) was restructured in March 2003 to include a
Priority Crimes Litigation Unit with a mandate to investigate “matters emanating from the
347
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TRC Process”, with an emphasis on prosecutions and missing persons.
351
 However, the Unit
was weak and has virtually no investigative capacity and the few cases that were initiated 
after 2003 were, according to the CSVR, met with “procedural obstacles and institutional 
lethargy.”
352
Policy amendments to the prosecution policy allowed “for the non-prosecution of those who
met the TRC requirements for amnesty” and “provided additional open-ended criteria under
which the NDPP could decline to prosecute, even where there was enough evidence to secure 
a conviction.”
353
It made no provision for victims to have access to the truth disclosed by
perpetrators and was a completely exclusionary process. The prosecution guidelines relating 
to the prosecution of “matters relating to the past” were furthermore, unlike the TRC
legislation, drawn up without any consultation from the public and victims.
354
The Legal
Resources Centre, on behalf of relatives of victims and three human rights organisations –
Khulumani, the South Africa office of the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
and CSVR – argued in the Constitutional Court that the guidelines were unconstitutional and
amounted to a “copy or duplication of” the TRC amnesty process. 
Another related issue is the more recent proposals of a framework policy for „presidential
pardons‟. In November 2007, President Mbeki announced that there would be a special 
pardons process for alleged political offenders who had committed crimes in the past and up 
until 16 June 1999. Despite Mbeki‟s statement that the process would “uphold and be guided
by the principles, criteria and spirit of the TRC” the special dispensation for political pardons
was shrouded in secrecy and didn‟t allow for victims to make representations regarding 
decisions about who would get presidential pardon. An application to interdict the President
from granting pardons under this pardons process was therefore brought by a coalition of
human rights organisations – CSVR, Khulumani, Human Rights Media Centre, Freedom of
Expression Institute, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, ICTJ (South Africa) – on the 
grounds that the special dispensation to grant pardons to political prisoners was
351
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unconstitutional and violated the rights of victims and interested parties to make 
representation. 
Up until this time these human rights organisations do not appear to have received strong 
support from the wider human rights community for their objections to the lack of follow-up 
prosecutions. Civil society in South Africa has been relatively quiet and inactive with regard 
to the hiatus in prosecutions and legal proceedings in post-apartheid South Africa.
355
 Civil
societies‟ engagement with post-TRC issues has also been relatively ad-hoc and piecemeal 
and has been limited to a „reactive‟ role by way of litigation.  
6.2 Conclusion 
The historical accounts of the Argentine and South African human rights communities‟
debates around the emerging problem of accountability for human rights atrocities has shown
that the ways in which the issue of amnesty emerged as a human rights issue, both in terms of
timing and in terms of content, differed significantly.
In Argentine, early attempts by the military to entrench a self-amnesty at the beginning of
1983 were met with fierce opposition from the human rights movements. However, unlike in
SA, amnesty was not posed as a precondition for the transition. At the time that the Argentine
junta proposed a general self-amnesty, the junta did not appear to have the power to insist on 
a general amnesty. This contrasts to the case in South Africa where the Government of
National Unity ostensibly relied on the cooperation of the prior regime to secure a smooth 
and peaceful transition while the security forces insisted on amnesty. Another important 
factor that sets the Argentine transition apart from the South African transition was the
extreme violence that characterised the lead up to the political transition in SA. As shown in
Chapter Three, the extent of the increasing political violence was a major concern for human
rights organisations at the time. A negotiated settlement offered a solution to the violence; 
and a negotiated settlement (ostensibly) rested on the provision of amnesty for apartheid 
human rights atrocities. Thus, it is conceivable, that an amnesty with the prospect of bringing 
about peace and an end to the violence became acceptable to the human rights community at 
the time.
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In the case of Argentine it was only two years after the official transition that the military
became more of a threat to the new Alfonsin administration. It was only at this point that,
responding to fears of a military backlash, Alfonsin attempted to limit the scope of the
prosecutions for human rights atrocities. This was then met with fierce opposition from the 
human rights movement and particularly the victims and family organisations within the 
movement. This however was at a time when the human rights movement‟s demands for
retributive justice had gained considerable momentum and popular support. Importantly, the 
issue of amnesty in the case of Argentine was never framed as part and parcel of a negotiated
transition in the same way as the South African amnesty was part of the negotiated settlement 
reached at CODESA II. So, whereas in South Africa, the amnesty issue was framed first and
foremost as a transitional justice issue and as a requirement for a peaceful transition, this was 
not the case in Argentine where the issue was approached, at least initially, solely from the 
perspective of a human rights movement with an agenda for truth and (retributive) justice.
It is significant that in the case of South Africa there was no central human rights movement 
focused on issues of truth and justice comparable to the Argentine human rights movement.
In Argentine, victims and relatives groups, set up in the early days of the repression,
articulated their demands for transitional justice, in terms of “truth” and “justice” at a very
early stage of the transition. Indeed, by the time of the transition a forceful human rights
movement with victims and family organisations and human rights organisations at its core
had developed. In the lead up to the transition, the movement rallied around their central
demands for truth about the disappeared and prosecutions for human rights atrocities. The
human rights movement had influenced the public discourse around transitional justice to 
such an extent that political parties used it as part of their election campaigns to gain votes in 
the 1983 elections. The candidate that demonstrated more of a commitment to a principled 
human rights approach to transitional justice than any other was Alfonsin who won the 
elections over the traditionally more popular Peronist party. 
In comparison, the human rights community in South Africa could firstly not be characterised 
as a movement. While there were significant social and political anti-apartheid movements in 
South Africa in the lead up to and during the transition these can not be classified as human 
rights movements as such. Indeed, while the SA human rights community was a part of the 














rights community in South Africa did not have a base that was independent of political 
movements as in Argentine. Instead, the human rights community was part of the anti-
apartheid struggle in a minor and more secondary capacity.  
The SA human rights community‟s general response to the transition had been focused on
socio-economic injustices that were the result and legacy of apartheid. As shown in Chapter
Three, from early on the human rights community signalled its intention to take forward
socio-economic issues of development, health, and education etc as matters of priority in the 
„new‟ South Africa. Significantly, among their priorities was not the issue of
amnesty/prosecutions/accountability for apartheid human rights atrocities, certainly not in 
way comparable to the Argentine human rights movement. In comparison to the Argentine
human rights movement there was generally no single and coordinated agenda among
members of the human rights community in terms of their approach to amnesty and
transitional justice, with the exception of the human rights community‟s later mobilisation for
public amnesty hearings. 
The SA human rights community‟s response to the issue of socio-economic injustices as its
central concern in the context of the transition can possibly be understood using Tina
Rosenberg‟s distinction between different “legacies of injustice”. Certainly a response to the 
“legacies of injustice” must be shaped by the content and context of human rights violations
to be dealt. In this sense Rosenberg‟s distinction between Latin America‟s “regimes of
criminals” and the Communist dictatorships “criminal regimes” is a crucial one. In the case
of the former, victims need the truth and also justice for human rights atrocities. In the case of
the latter, victims need to know the truth about what happened but “more than anything 
else…these victims need a new society that works better than the old.”
356
While direct human rights violations (murder, torture, kidnapping etc) were committed 
against mainly outspoken political dissidents and activists (as in Latin America), the majority 
of human rights abuses under apartheid were a direct consequence of the apartheid system of 
institutionalised racism, a system that was itself a „crime against humanity.‟  Unlike in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, the apartheid system was also based on and perpetuated by 
intense racial divisions between whites and non-whites.  
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In South Africa there was therefore a need for truth and justice but also for affirmative action 
and a new social and economic “system”. As a response to the intense racial divisions, there 
was also a need for societal reconstruction and reconciliation at both the individual and 
political level. Apartheid left a legacy of injustice that “truth” and retributive justice through 
the courts alone could arguably not address. Importantly, in the South African transition, the 
nature and extent of violations required a range of responses to a range of problems. It is 
arguable that prosecutions would not have impacted on this in any significant way. Rather, a 
strong and enforceable Bill of Rights in the Constitution, with an effective and functional 
democratic state, to implement and ensure these rights would be a more appropriate „remedy‟ 
and as such, given the focus of the human rights community on such socio-economic issues 
would likely have been of more concern to the human rights community at the time than 
prosecutions and retributive justice.  
Given the human rights community‟s relative lack of concern for retributive justice at the
early stages of the transition, it is not surprising that the lack of follow-up prosecutions has 
not occasioned more of an outcry from the human rights community. While in the case of
Argentine, human rights organisations and victims groups have sustained their call for 
prosecutions for human rights atrocities this has not been the case at all in South Africa. This 
may appear especially surprising considering that the legitimacy of the conditional South 
African amnesty arguably rested on the complementary and follow-up prosecutions. Instead
of foreclosing the option of prosecutions, the South African amnesty actually implied
prosecutions as a necessary counterpart to the individual and conditional amnesty agreement. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 5 there was no strategy or plan set up for how 
complementary and/or follow-up prosecutions would be dealt with. This was indeed a
momentous omission – one that the human rights community failed to problematise and
address at the time. 
As discussed in the previous subsection there has been some organised action by a few 
human rights organisations around the issue of outstanding prosecutions. This is yet to 
develop into sustained action and activism comparable to that in Argentine. There is room for 
further research regarding the extent to which the human rights community has followed 
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